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Abstract
The world is in the midst of an unprecedented environmental crisis driven
primarily by human behavior. As the world has globalized, countries have developed, and
standards of living have improved, global pollution has skyrocketed and has resulted in a
wide range of environmentally destructive outcomes. All paths to environmentally
sustainable development involve a dramatic cut in carbon emissions from current day
levels. In this thesis, I explore how the omission of behavioral factors from mainstream
neoclassical models has contributed to, and can aid in reducing unsustainably high levels
of carbon emissions. Throughout the history of economic thought, classical economists
such as Smith, Knight, and Fisher explicitly state that humans are prone to acting in a
way that is inconsistent with utility and profit optimization models. Despite these
warnings, the widespread acceptance of theories reliant on revealed preference with
homogenous rational agents led to the normalization of overconsumption and
environmentally destructive behavior. In the 1980’s, economists began systematically
exposing universal shortcomings in human rationality, many of which directly contribute
to unsustainable levels of emissions. Incorporating these biases into mainstream
economics presents policy makers with a number of novel, cost-effective tools to curb
carbon emissions, and compels a reevaluation of what it means to act rationally.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Right now, in Econ 101 classes all around the world, students are being taught the
concepts of marginal cost and revenue, utility curves, product possibility frontiers, costbenefit analysis, and efficiently run widget factories. The human beings behind the
graphs and functions are mentioned in class discussion but are ultimately irrelevant to the
grade. At a glance, one may easily mistake a microeconomics final for an advanced
algebra test. The answers to utility optimization and profit maximization problems are
taught as how consumers and producers should behave to achieve societally efficient
outcomes; economic agents are assumed to be rational, utility-maximizing creatures.
Behavioral factors and psychological inconsistencies are assumed away in the aggregate
and are largely considered unimportant. However, a closer look at the history of
economic thought reveals that economics has not always been as mathematized as it is
today. In fact, many founding members of the field were acutely aware of the logical and
ethical dangers of thinking too normatively about human behavior. Many of these
ignored warnings have direct implications on how we understand and approach
environmental sustainability and climate change. This paper addresses the question: ‘how
can behavioral insights help reduce carbon emissions?’ In order to fully address this
question, we must also explore the consequences of omitting behavioral factors from our
understanding of economic decision making and the efficacy of attempted course
1

corrections based in mainstream thought. This paper reviews the history and evolution of
economic thought regarding behavioral factors, explores the ethical consequences of
embracing neoclassical optimization theories, and reviews the most pertinent
contemporary literature surrounding the efficacy of behavioral interventions in achieving
socially efficient outcomes.
Chapter 2 is an exploration of behavioral insights throughout the history of
economic thought. Adam Smith and J.S. Mill were amongst the early critics of a purely
normative mode of discussing human action; Veblen and Knight later spotted dubious
moral implications of accepting the outcomes of human discussion to be the product of a
rational process. They recognized that the self-fulfilling idea that consumption reveals
optimized preferences reduces human action to an epicurean calculus and normalizes
hedonistic behavior. Even Irving Fisher, who helped mathematize the field, wrote
extensively about the failures of human rationality. Despite their warnings, mainstream
economics became increasingly normative throughout the 20th century thanks to the work
of Friedman and others in the Chicago school. In accepting the ideas of mainstream
theory as fact, we opened the door to conspicuous over-consumption and rapidly
accelerated the climate crisis. In the 1970s, researchers began to catalogue widespread
discrepancies between the predicted outcomes of mainstream theory and the real world.
Researchers in this branch of study, which became behavioral economics, asserted that
economic models of human behavior must include behavioral insights and acknowledge
failures of human rationality to be considered realistic.
Chapter 3 is an overview of a selection of the most important findings of
behavioral economists over the last 40 years and their direct impacts on climate change.
2

Many of the biases and heuristics that researchers have repeatedly exposed show that
people do not act in a manner that is consistent with mainstream economic theory. We
form beliefs on the most readily available information instead of the most accurate
information, frequently make errors when projecting future utility, and have a stubborn
attachment to the status quo (even when it's not in our best interest). These deviations
from mainstream consumption models have wide-ranging consequences, including how
we value ecological processes, and helps explain why we fail to act on climate issues.
Chapter 4 is a comparison of neoclassical solutions to climate change against
those which incorporate behavioral insights. First, there are various methodological
issues associated with valuing the costs and benefits of environmentally destructive
development, and incorporating these insights may provide a more accurate idea of the
true value of ecological processes. Additionally, in various contexts, money has proven to
be amongst the most expensive methods to change behavior, whereas low-cost behavioral
interventions are significantly more cost-effective. Because humans do not evaluate the
world the way neoclassical theory assumes we do, there are several underutilized, costeffective measures, which incorporate psychological insights and emotional queues, that
policymakers have at their disposal to help achieve carbon-cutting goals.
Chapter 5 investigates the paths forward for policymakers when confronting the
environmental crisis, as well as potential pitfalls. Taking account of people’s trust in
defaults, anticipating the effects of framing information, utilizing cool-off periods, and
simplifying complex choices have all been shown to increase the likelihood a person acts
in accordance with neoclassical economic theory. In many circumstances, using these
sorts of interventions does result in more environmentally friendly behavior (Camerer
3

2003; Thaler 2008). However, there is a danger in adopting the behavioralist mindset as
they fall into the same trap as mainstream economists: they assume that utility
maximization is how one ought to act. This oversight directly contradicts and ignores the
warnings of classical economists, even the advice of Adam Smith.
Chapter 6 concludes with a brief overview of the previous chapters, as well as
some concluding remarks. The urgency of addressing climate change increases every
day, and dogmatic attachment to normative economic theories sews the seeds of its own
destruction. While the omission of behavioral insights from mainstream theory is
undoubtedly problematic and has contributed to the climate crisis, we should not simply
"correct" people's behavior with rational ends in mind. We must overcome the hedonistic
calculus and redefine utility while prioritizing sustainable outcomes.

1.1 Introduction to Climate Change
Of all the human-created problems that dominate the daily headlines, there are
few as urgent or universal as global climate change. The evidence of climate change,
primarily driven by increased CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, is undeniable,
and it affects, to varying degrees, every human being on the face of the planet.
According to a 2018 climate report, human activity has already caused
temperatures to rise approximately 1.0ºC above preindustrial levels, and we will likely
reach 1.5ºC between 2030 and 2052 without drastic changes in carbon-emitting behavior
(IPCC 2018). According to the US Global Change Research Program, “Evidence for
climate change abounds, from the top of the atmosphere to the depth of the oceans… this
warming has driven primarily by human activity” (Harris & Roach 2018, 307). Carbon
4

emissions have increased dramatically since the mid 20th century, with developed
countries emitting the most carbon per capita; for example, citizens of the United States
emit 17 metric tons of CO2 per year, citizens in most other developed countries emit in
the range of 4 to 10 metric tons per year, while people in developing countries emit less
than 4 metric tons per year (Harris & Roach 2018, 313). Researchers have estimated that
if the everyone consumed at the same per person level as Americans, the world could
only support 1.4 billion people (Magdoff and Foster 2011). While everyone does bear the
cost of a changing climate, not every area is affected equally, for instance, the arctic and
Antarctic regions have been warming at a rate double the global average. As carbon
emissions continue to rise, more and more carbon and heat is absorbed by the oceans
which causes ocean acidification, the destruction of marine habitats, and rising ocean
levels. Over the last century and a half, oceans have been consistently rising by about
2mm per year which has resulted in a cumulative rise of 9 inches since 1880; if the West
Antarctic ice sheet disintegrates, sea levels could rise by more than 12 feet. The ocean is
acidifying at its fastest rate in 300 million years which is causing massive disruption to
marine ecosystems (Harris & Roach 2018, 315). Without emission reductions, coral reefs
are expected to decline by 70-90%; coastal resources, fisheries, and aquaculture
(especially in areas near the equator) are facing irreversible damage. Warming
temperatures will result in smaller crop yields and increased water stress, especially in
Sub-Saharan, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America. There is also the danger
that higher temperatures will lead to increases in diseases such as malaria and dengue
fever (IPCC 2018, 9). These projections are of course just that: projections. But there is
ample evidence of damage already done and numerous troubling trends of environmental
5

degradation. Between 1970 and 2016, populations of mammals, birds, amphibians,
reptiles, and fish decreased by more than 68%. More than 75% of the world’s land has
been altered by human development, and 85% of wetlands have been lost; this has
contributed to over 1 million species being threatened to the point of extinction.
Researchers approximate that humanity is currently overusing the Earth’s biocapacity by
56% (WWF 2020). Current models project that we are currently consuming at a rate that
exceeds planetary boundaries on several dimensions including the rate at which nitrogen
is removed from the atmosphere for human use as well as loss in biodiversity (Steffen et
al. 2015). In addition to these excesses, humanity is rapidly approaching the ecological
thresholds for freshwater use, ocean acidification, and change in land use (Rockstrom et
al. 2009). We have passed the point where the status quo is viable; inaction is no longer a
workable option.
The dangers of climate change are undeniable and, taken as a whole,
overwhelming. Yet climate scientists have identified many measurable, albeit lofty, goals
to minimize the effects of climate change. In order to slow and eventually reverse climate
change trends, global carbon emissions must decline by 45% from 2010 levels by 2030,
reaching net zero emissions by 2050 (IPCC 2018, 12). Other estimates state that a 70%
reduction in global emissions would reduce humanity’s ecological footprint from 1.64
earths to 0.96 earths (Harris & Roach 2018, 219). The modern, globalized, capitalist
world operates on the neoclassical assumptions that markets achieve efficient outcomes
and that negative externalities can be accounted for and corrected through the price
mechanism. Yet, as the evidence shows, the market has failed, and we are rapidly
approaching an unprecedented climate disaster.
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The goals set by climate scientists are ambitious, but the problem is pressing, and
the culprit is obvious: ubiquitous overconsumption in developed countries. The top 8% of
carbon emitters contribute half of total greenhouse gas emissions; the average carbon
footprint of the top 1% of income earners is significantly larger than that of the bottom
half of the income distribution (Magdoff & Foster 2011). Growth correlates with
pollution, so as the world has industrialized and standards of living have improved,
pollution has skyrocketed. The last century has seen an explosion in water use, sulfur
emissions, energy use, CO2 emissions, meat/fish consumption, and car usage.
Neoclassical theory operates under the assumptions that more consumption is better than
less, and that people's consumption choices reveal an accurate window into their utilitymaximizing preferences. This overly simplistic view of human decision-making helps
explain some of the underlying causes of climate change. Acceptance of utility
maximization theory encourages people to consume with no regard to non-salient or
long-term outcomes, and thus, normalizes unsustainable levels of consumption.
“Basically, the economic system does not work when it comes to protecting
environmental resources, and the political system does not work when it comes to
correcting the economic system" (Speth 2008, 52). The neoclassical tools, using taxes
and incentives to promote societally efficient market outcomes, have categorically failed
at achieving sustainable forms of growth.
Achieving these climate goals will require both supply-side (switching from a
fossil fuel reliant energy grid to one based on renewable energy sources) and demandside solutions (changing people's carbon-emitting behavior). The literature exploring
supply-side solutions is extensive (IPCC 2019; WWF 2020; Harris & Roach 2018). and
7

will not be discussed in depth in this paper. Demand-side solutions, on the other hand, are
generally believed to be the most cost-effective and environmentally friendly approach to
achieving carbon emission goals and will be the primary focus of the proceeding
chapters. Despite the overwhelming evidence for the necessity of drastic action, no
country is currently on a carbon trajectory that is truly sustainable (Wendling et al. 2020).
The proposals explored in this paper, by themselves, will not reverse climate trends,
however, can be part of a bigger solution. The reasons for inaction are innumerable and,
to a certain extent, irrelevant; the modern globalized market economy is failing, and we
are faced with one of the largest existential threats in human history. And for us to know
the path forward, we must understand how we got here.

8

Chapter 2: Classical Behavioral Economists
A selective reading of classical economists has led to the omission of behavioral
insights from neoclassical economic models. Political economists and ancient
philosophers were fully aware of the importance of emotional states and other
psychological factors in the human decision-making process, and this persisted through
the age of Adam Smith. Several classical economists, including Smith, J.S. Mill,
Thorstein Veblen, Frank Knight, and Irving Fisher acknowledged the importance of
psychological limitations in economic decision making. These insights were largely
ignored by mainstream economics, and throughout the mid 20th century, the field became
increasingly mathematized and reliant on rationality assumptions. Theories of rational
markets and revealed preference won the day, and a “hedonistic calculus” became
mainstream. In omitting behavioral insights from neoclassical theory, economics has
actively contributed to widescale market and nonmarket failures, including the ongoing
climate crisis.

2.1 Adam Smith
Adam Smith, often dubbed the “Father of Economics”, is most well-known for
The Wealth of Nations (1776). This is well deserved, as there are few books whose
influence is as far-reaching; however, the fame of Wealth of Nations detracts from his
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other, earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759). To admonish the first with
endless praise and ignore the latter is to have an incomplete picture of Smith’s ideas and
philosophy.
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith portrays humans as deeply flawed,
irrational, ridiculous beings who frequently act in direct conflict with self-interests, and
who are frequently guided by short-term "passions" rather than by rationality. These
passions are inevitable, not something we can combat, but something we all must
confront and internalize in our own way. “[H]is own passions are apt to mislead him—
sometimes to drive him and sometimes to seduce him to violate all the rules which he
himself, in all his sober and cool hours, approves of” (Smith 1759, 164). Furthermore,
Smith highlights throughout the book that to act virtuously frequently requires the
conscious rejection of the impulses that accompany our passions, “[T]hat to feel much for
others and little for ourselves… constitutes the perfection of human nature…” and that
virtuous actions “require the greatest exertions of self-command” (Smith 1759, 20-21).
This paints a much different picture of economic agents than is portrayed in mainstream
theory. Whereas mainstream theory is founded on the premise that people choose by
optimizing, Smith argues that people’s choices depend on which way the wind is
blowing. Moreover, he argues that the correct way of living frequently involves resisting
our compulsive desires. Already, we can see a notable difference between the agents in
models Smith is famous for inspiring, and people who act in the real world.
One of Smith’s most important insights in The Theory of Moral Sentiments is
distinguishing the "indulgent and partial spectator" from the rational, "impartial
spectator.” Smith writes: “The propriety of our moral sentiments is never so apt to be
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corrupted as when the indulgent and partial spectator is at hand, while the indifferent and
impartial one is at a great distance” (Smith 1759, 106). In creating these dueling
characters, Smith argues that human behavior contains paradoxes and that the actions of a
person cannot be understood by viewing them as a singular agent. While the impartial
spectator has the power to look back and judge past decisions, it is the partial spectator,
guided by whims and passions, who is more frequently making the final decision on what
one will and will not do.
Smith continues to make the point that even if we are aware of our impartial
spectators, letting them take control of our decision-making is a hard thing to accomplish.
It is hard for us, as humans, to put aside our own beliefs and biases and judge our own
behavior. He writes that we fail “to view it in the light which any indifferent spectator
would consider it” and even goes as far to say that “[t]his self-deceit, this fatal weakness
of mankind, is the source of half the disorders of human life” (Smith 1759, 109).
Mainstream economics posits that errors cancel out on the aggregate; Smith argues the
opposite. There is no invisible hand magically guiding people into making the utilitymaximizing decision. There is nothing inherently efficient or economical in the way
humans act. Rather, "half of the disorders of human life" can be directly attributed to
these errors and biases!
In addition to introducing a two-agent model for individual decision-making,
Smith directly attacks the idea that revealed preferences reflect optimized utility. First, he
recognizes that a significant part of utility maximization comes from the imagination.
"The imaginations of mankind… and such passions… are always, in some measure,
ridiculous" (Smith 1759, 25). Each person is at the whim of her own passions, which are
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products of her own imagination, and since others' imaginations are inaccessible to her,
everyone's passions are absurd. In other words, there is inherent subjectivity in human
motivations and decisions.
Secondly, Smith understands that the promise of increased utility can often be a
stronger motivator than actual gained utility. “How many people ruin themselves by
laying out money on trinkets of frivolous utility?” (Smith 1759, 125). Smith writes that
our partial spectator will always value present utility over future utility, and that can lead
to suboptimal outcomes. “The pleasure which we are to enjoy ten years hence interests us
so little in comparison with that which we may enjoy today…” (Smith 1759, 131). To
illustrate his point, Smith uses the universally understood proverb, “the eye is larger than
the belly” (Smith 1759, 127), and cites how the capacity of our stomachs bears no weight
on the extent of our desire to eat. While Smith’s example is somewhat benign, it is easy
to see the inefficiencies and potential problems that accompany our collective tendency to
consume today at the expense of tomorrow. Sometimes, its consequences are limited to a
night of uncomfortable digestion; but on an global scale, this hedonistic philosophy can
lead to truly disastrous consequences. Or, as Smith puts it, “The great source of both the
misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from over-rating the differences
between one permanent situation and another” (Smith 1759, 103).
Throughout The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith identifies many fundamental
differences between people in the real world and those in economic models. This includes
the observation that pain is a more “pungent sensation than pleasure” (Smith1759, 34),
which hints at an idea that would later become to be known as “loss aversion.” He writes
of people becoming irrationally fond of essentially worthless objects, “If he breaks or
12

loses them, he is vexed out of all proportion to the value of the damage” (Smith 1759,
69). This is similar to the idea in Behavioral Economics of the “endowment effect”, or
that people disproportionately overvalue things they have in hand. Both of these
inefficacies of human rationality, in addition to the ones previously mentioned, fly
directly in the face of the utility-maximizing agent presented in neoclassical economic
models and are presented by the "Father of Economics" himself! They have largely been
explained away as 'marginal' or as errors that cancel out in the aggregate, but this line of
thinking leaves open the possibility of systematic and measurable failures in rationality.
While early economists could justify creating an oversimplified economic agent for the
sake of theory, it is a grave mistake to pretend these seemingly irrelevant factors have not
perpetuated the current climate crisis.
Smith was far from the first writer to recognize flaws in human rationality,
although he may have been the first economist. He concludes The Theory of Moral
Sentiments with several citations from Cicero, Epicurus, Aristotle, and other
philosophers. Aristotle writes in the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue is the habit of
moderation, which leads to the conclusion that utility maximation is antithetical to living
virtuously. There is nothing novel in Smith’s observations; to a certain extent, Smith is
simply reframing ancient ideas for a modern, capitalist audience. With this context, the
work of behavioral economists in the 1970s and 1980s was not a revolution, but a rebirth
of old ideas that were set aside because they were messy and complicated. After all, what
is an economist supposed to do with a person whose actions are determined by
“imaginary” passions which sometimes, but not always, influence the person to act
against their long-term self-interest? How does a researcher fit that into a mathematical
13

model? These questions are completely valid, and to argue that the only useful model is
one that perfectly captures every passing whim would be disingenuous and
counterproductive. However, relaxing some of the rigid, quixotic assumptions that
underlie mainstream economic models provides the opportunity to combat issues like
climate change with a new set of tools based on actual human behavior.
Similar to how The Wealth of Nations laid the foundation for mainstream
economics, The Theory of Moral Sentiments paved the way for behavioral economics.
Smith deviates significantly from the utility-maximizing, rational human presented in
mainstream models and, instead, argues that humans are hopelessly inept at forecasting
and maximizing their future utility, but also that utility maximization is not the goal of a
virtuous life. At one point, Smith brings up the example of Isaac Newton, whose book on
natural science and mathematics sat unsold in bookstores for years before people
recognized its value. I cannot help but think it is ironic that this anecdote is located in
Smith’s less studied and analyzed book, and that, perhaps, economics, whether out of
arrogance or apathy, fell into the exact trap Smith warns of in the book. Economists
failed to recognize the value of the insights sitting on the shelf next to their foundational
text.

2.2 John Stuart Mill
Adam Smith was not alone in recognizing the importance of behavioral factors in
human decision-making. A number of economists throughout the 19th and early 20th
centuries made similar nods to behavioral inefficiencies that mathematical models were
incapable of capturing. While economics was still finding its footing in the scientific
14

community, J.S. Mill wrote an essay called “On the Definition and Method of Political
Economy” in which he makes many of the same observations as Smith and identifies
shortcomings in the methods and assumptions of political economy.
The first thing that Mill notes in his essay is the incredibly limited context in
which the study of “political economy”, or economics, is truly reflective of human
behavior. Economics only concerns itself with the human desire for and pursuit of wealth
and “makes entire abstraction of every other human passion or motive” (Mill 1877, 41).
Mill continues by writing that “Political Economy considers mankind as occupied solely
in acquiring and consuming wealth” and assumes that everyone is a “ruler of all their
actions” (Mill 1877, 42). Mill highlights these assumptions to bring attention to the fact
that they directly contradict experience and that any conclusions based on these
assumptions should be considered to be something other than the truth. Political
economy, according to Mill, "presupposed an arbitrary definition of man" (Mill 1877, 45)
and is therefore only applicable to a specific context in which pursuit of wealth is the
only motivating force in a person’s life.
Smith frames Theory of Moral Sentiments by pointing out the shortcomings in
human rationality and how that relates to moral action, while Mill frames his essay
around the obvious absurdity of the assumptions that make up economics and limits the
scope of his conclusions to economics. Mill does not see these discrepancies between
classical assumptions and real human behavior as a death knell to the entire science and,
instead, views them as essential footnotes to any conclusion that comes from the field.
“The conclusions of Political Economy, consequently, like those of geometry, are only
true… in the abstract; that is, they are only true under certain suppositions” (Mill 1877,
15

48). Mill subsequentially outlines why generalizing assumptions in the field of economics
are inevitable and justifiable; the field, generally speaking, attempts to use the scientific
method in the same way that chemists and biologists utilize it but runs into pragmatic
problems early in the research process. Economists cannot answer the question ‘what is
the effect of protectionist trade policy?’ in the same way chemists can answer ‘what is the
effect of combining element X with solution Y?’ Chemists can isolate compounds, have
strictly controlled variables in all of their experiments, and can chart various outcomes
across varying conditions to isolate the effects of element X on solution Y. Economists
do not enjoy that same luxury. It is not possible to find two countries (identical in
population, natural resources, geography, etc.) to tell one country to adopt a free trade
policy and the other to adopt a more protectionist approach. Even if this were possible,
there are endogenous cultural and political factors that are impossible to account for
when comparing a 'control' country against their protectionist neighbor. Economics
cannot isolate variables the same ways chemists can in laboratories, and therefore is faced
with a paradox: it needs to be descriptive of the real world to be worthwhile, yet it lacks
the capacity to do so. Mill finds a middle ground:
Since therefore it is vain to hope that truth can be arrived at, either in Political
Economy or in any other department of the social science, while we look at the
facts in the concrete, clothed in all the complexity with which nature has
surrounded them, and endeavor to elicit a general law by a process of induction
from a comparison of details; there remains no other method than the à priori one,
or that of “abstract speculation.” (Mill 1877, 48)
Limiting the scope of economics to the realms which solely concern themselves
with the abstract production and accumulation of wealth provides a good starting point
for delineating what economics can and cannot solve. The idea that traditional economic
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tools can be applied to solve problems that are not directly related to the production and
accumulation of wealth directly contradicts classical economists. So, when faced with a
problem like global climate change, it is important to take notes of the limitations in what
claims to be 'objective' analysis. Saving the environment is a categorically different
problem than optimizing utility or maximizing output with given inputs, so
acknowledging the limitations that exist within mainstream economic tools is a step in
the right direction.
After defining the realm in which economics provides useful insights, the next
step is to identify the areas of life which economics neglects. According to Mill, these
oversights are far from irrelevant. Mill describes the "discrepancy between anticipations
and the actual fact" as one of the "disturbing" phenomena which economics frequently
overlooks (Mill 1877, 51). This is because everyone in a marketplace is operating on
different sets of information. "A person may be warranted in feeling confident, that
whatever he has carefully contemplated with his mind’s eye he has seen correctly; but no
one can be sure that there is not something in existence which he has not seen at all”
(Mill 1877, 55). Similar to Smith’s argument that the promise of gained utility is a more
powerful motivator than attained utility, Mill acknowledges the unavoidable subjectivity
in decision making and the discrepancy between our expectations and tangible results.
This undermines the idea that there are any discoverable “laws” of human behavior and
necessitates a more nuanced approach to social science than is necessary in the natural
sciences. There can be no ‘law of revealed preference’ because there are so many
concrete exceptions to the law, and, as Mill put it, “there are not a law and an exception
to that law… There are two laws” (Mill 1877, 57). Therefore, economists need to be
17

careful in the kinds of assertions they make. Rather than presenting theories and data
analysis as absolute facts, economics needs to acknowledge its epistemological limits;
this requires a holistic reexamination of mainstream economic theory and a critical look
at how these oversights may be contributing to global climate change.

2.3 Into The 20th Century
Economics continued to evolve and establish itself amongst the social sciences
into the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and with that development came a major push to
mathematize the field and an increased emphasis on the power of normative models.
Great economists like Jevons, Walras, and Menger, known for starting the marginalist
revolution, pushed the field forward by normalizing the rationality hypothesis in the hope
that economics “might gradually be erected into an exact science…” (Jevons 1871, 21).
They modeled that an economic agent will necessarily maximize their utility under a
given budget constraint and subsequently introduced the concept of a demand curve and
market equilibrium (Arrow 1986). In shifting the focus of economics away from the
relatively narrow “acquisition and consumption of wealth” and towards the abstract idea
of utility maximization, the marginalists expanded the scope of what economics was
capable of achieving, the questions it was capable of answering, and lost track of the line
between abstraction and reality.
The marginalists separated themselves from classical economists through their
mathematical rigor and through introducing the idea that people make decisions based on
marginal utility. Rather than more always being better, a person’s economic decisions are
based on what she already has. Despite this refinement, the marginalists also founded
18

most of their theories on the same simplifying assumptions as the classical economists.
Smith and Mill’s concerns about the limitations of normative economic theories were set
to the side because, frankly, no one knew what to do with them. This does not mean that
economists who were active during the marginalist revolution were unaware of the
shortcomings, but it does mean that behavioral inefficiencies were not center stage.
Numerous economists from that period, both within and outside of the marginalist
perspective, were completely conscious of these systematic biases, yet their insights were
set aside for nearly six decades.
An early, unsurprising critic of mainstream economic theory was Thorstein
Veblen. He, like Mill and Smith before him, did not consider the lack of behavioral
insights in economic models to be a menial complication to economic theory, but,
instead, a critical oversight in the development of economic theory. Veblen, in his essay
“The Limitations of Marginal Utility” (1909), recognizes that the marginalist ‘revolution’
was not a revolution at all and that marginalist theories and models were based on the
same simplifying assumptions as their classical predecessors. The only discernable
difference that Veblen identifies is that classical economics is confined within “narrower
limits and sticks more consistently to its teleological premises” (Veblen 1909, 130). Since
the marginalists were not directly addressing the inadequacies of the core assumptions of
classical theory, their refinements to economic theory were not improvements, but a step
in the wrong direction. Veblen begins his critique by simply stating the underlying
assumptions of marginalist and classical theories. “Mankind is (conceived to be)
clearsighted and farsighted in its appreciation of the future sensuous gains and losses"
(Veblen 1909, 132). This echoes back to Smith's "impartial spectator" and the idea that
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according to mainstream economic models, people, in general, are perfect and predicting
the future. Veblen argues, instead, that the principle of sufficient reason, an idea that
dates back to Leibnitz in the 17th century and which underpins marginalist utility
maximization models, is only useful to the extent that people are actually reasonable. “It
deals with this conduct only insofar as it may be construed as rationalistic, teleological
terms of calculation and choice” (Veblen 1909, 134). In this way, Veblen wrangles in the
scope of what economics is capable of doing for the same reasons that Smith and Mill
identified. The marginalists equate utility and monetary value and take the nuance and
dimensionality away from actual human behavior, and this, in Veblen’s opinion, is
economics’ cardinal sin. Smith and Mill both observe that how one ought to act is
frequently antithetical to what maximizes personal utility; but after the marginalists had
their say, acting in a way that maximizes one’s utility is the only way one can act. To
tirelessly pursue the accumulation of wealth became the right way to act in the world
since theory posits that it leads to socially efficient outcomes. Behavioral biases and
systematic failures in human rationality are explained away in the aggregate because
there is no longer an action that is not considered ‘economic’ in nature. This shift in
thinking is subtle yet its impacts on the development of capitalism over the proceeding
century are immeasurable. The shift led to the rise of what Veblen coins the “hedonistic
calculus” or the “direct and unhampered quest of the net sensuous gain” (Veblen 1909,
137) and the normalization of consuming today at the expense of tomorrow. The virtuous
person that Smith portrays in his work who, against their inner passions, consumes in
moderation is thrown out of mainstream economic thought and is replaced with a
hyperrational hedonist. “[We] mediate between the pain cost and the pleasure gain of
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hedonistic choice, without a lag, league, or friction; they are conceived simply as the
immutably correct, God-given notation of the hedonistic calculus” (Veblen 1909, 138). In
mainstream models, the impartial spectator is always in the driver's seat, and is always
making the correct judgments and predictions about the world, which differs vastly from
the observations of the economists on whose writing mainstream models are based! How
one ought to act and how one acts become two sides of the same hedonic coin and
systematic failures are assumed to not exist.
In rebranding mainstream models as “hedonistic calculus,” Veblen gets at the
heart of what is wrong with mainstream economic theories. Not only does the calculus
require flawless logic and reasoning, but it also extends itself into every nonpecuniary
aspect of human life. This overextension of economic theory into noneconomic matters is
no longer merely an abstraction of human action, but a complete fantasy. Veblen writes
that it is important to delineate between the pecuniary and nonpecuniary areas of life,
whereas mainstream economic theory makes no such distinction. Thus, the logic applied
to the pursuit and accumulation of wealth extends itself into every area of human life
including art, science, philosophy, and religion. The different ends of these different areas
of human life are flattened into one, all-encompassing goal: to maximize one’s utility as
measured by economic activity. This premise seems at best, overly simplistic, and at
worst, alarmingly incorrect.
The price system dominates the current commonsense in its appreciation and
rating of these non-pecuniary ramifications of modern culture; and this in spite of
the fact that, on reflection, all men of normal intelligence will freely admit that
these matters lie outside the scope of pecuniary valuation. (Veblen 1909, 138)
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Veblen argues that limiting the motivations of human actions to the hyperrational
acquisition of wealth strips us of our humanity, that ignoring Smith’s partial spectator is
effectively the same as ignoring the true motivations of human action. “The wants and
desires, the end and aim, the ways and means, the amplitude and the drift of the
individual’s conduct are functions of an institutional variable that is of a highly complex
and wholly unstable character” (Veblen 1909, 136). Veblen recognizes the same
behavioral blind sights as Smith and Mill. The hyperrational hedonists who operate in
normative models do not resemble real people in the real world and this oversight has farranging consequences. Hedonism begets hedonism and behavioral failures begin to
snowball. The conclusions drawn from the hedonist calculus are, by their construct,
incomplete, and thus, any theory that fails to account for irrational behavior is incorrect.
“But since it is in just this unhedonistic, unrationalistic pecuniary traffic that the tissue of
business life consists… any theory of business which sets these elements aside or
explains them away misses the main facts which it has gone out to seek.” (Veblen 1909,
141). While the classical and marginalist schools of thought explain away systematic
error in the aggregate, Veblen argues that this is impossible because both are based on
fantastical, unrealistic assumptions about human rationality. Thus, mainstream models
miss the main facts which they seek to discover; by not considering behavioral factors,
economics fails at achieving its self-stated objectives. In fact, Veblen concludes his essay
by stating that if human action was subject to the assumptions of classical and marginalist
economics, “it is not conceivable that the institutional fabric would last overnight”
(Veblen 1909, 142). The marginalists, by introducing normative models based on rational
utility maximization, inadvertently designed economies around hedonistic tendencies and
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labeled them rational. The embrace of the hedonistic economy has led to systematic, selffulfilling market failures created by inescapable failures in human reasoning and has thus
been a major contributor to global climate change.
Perhaps it is unsurprising that an economic outsider like Veblen finds the lack of
consideration for behavioral factors in normative theory to be a critical flaw for
economics as a whole, but economists from various backgrounds make similar
observations. Frank Knight, one of the founders of the Chicago school of economics,
criticized economics for trying to prove itself as a “hard” science in his essay “Economics
and Human Action” (1935). In Knight’s view, economics wants to operate in the same
realm and command the same pragmatism as applied mechanics, which uses normative
models that apply to the real world. Similar to how mechanics begins with the
assumption of a frictionless world (e.g., modeling the motion of an object in a vacuum)
and then adds complexity, economics starts with a state of perfect competition and builds
in complexity. According to Knight, the desire to draw the parallel is a fundamental error,
“Perfect competition is, among other things irrelevant here, errorless competition;
fundamentally it is not comparable to a frictionless machine…” because not all people
are acting rationally or striving for “an objective result, but only as a tendency to
conformity with the intent of behavior, which intent cannot be measured or identified or
defined in terms of any experimental data” (Knight 1935, 103-104). In other words,
human behavior is driven by conformity to dynamic social norms, not by an allconsuming pursuit of maximizing personal utility. In confusing one for the other, the
tools economists can offer to solve human problems are inherently flawed and can have
the effect of normalizing problems rather than fixing them. “There seems to be no
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possibility of making human problems real, without seeing in human activity an element
of effort, contingency, and, most crucially, of error, which must for the same reasons be
assumed to be absent from natural processes.” (Knight 1935, 101). The assumption of
flawless economic reasoning does not result in an “abstraction” of real human behavior;
it strips economics of its usefulness. Knight concludes that what is abstracted in utility
maximization models is “the fact of error in economic behavior” (Knight 1935, 103).
That is to say that the only actionable takeaway from equilibrium price theory is the fact
that people do not act in accordance with utility maximization models.
Similar to the other economists mentioned in this chapter, Knight recognizes the
fact that normative models overextend themselves into areas of human life that are well
beyond the scope of economic transactions. While mainstream economic theory posits
that humans are in tireless pursuit of maximizing personal utility, a sizeable percentage of
human actions are in the pursuit of nothing tangible at all. “Indeed, the bulk of human
valuations, in connection with truth, beauty, and morals, are largely or altogether
independent of desire for any concrete thing or result” (Knight 1935, 102). In addition to
overextending itself into the non-economic realms of life, utility maximization models
reliant on revealed preference theory are insidiously destructive. Human actions,
according to Knight, are motivated by conformity to social norms, so acceptance of
revealed preference theory gives way to an ever increasingly hedonistic society.
Emphasizing maximized utility under the pretense that it is rational erases the distinction
between what is "right" and what maximizes short-term pleasure. Since the decisions of
individuals necessarily reveal what rationally maximizes their short- and long-term
utility, behavioral biases and errors become rationalized. The partial spectator starts
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wearing the mask of the impartial spectator, and systematic failures in human psychology
become normalized and rebranded as reasonable. Economics becomes a self-fulfilling
and self-cannibalizing machine.
Society cannot accept individual ends and individual means as data or as the main
objects of its own policy. In the first place, they simply are not data, but are
historically created in the social process itself and are inevitably affected by social
policy. Secondly, society cannot be even relatively indifferent to the workings of
the process. To do so would be ultimately destructive of society and individual
alike. This conclusion is strongly reinforced by the fact that the immediate interest
of the individual is largely competitive, centered in his own social advancement
relative to other individuals. (Knight 1935, 105)
In other words, treating subjective actions as objective data, as perfect insights
into what rationally maximizes one’s utility, as the product of an infallible calculus which
can accurately assess and forecast one’s long-term needs, as the consequence of
reasoning made by an “impartial spectator” leads the entire field of economics to draw
incorrect conclusions about human behavior. The subjective becomes absolute. Since the
assumptions of mainstream models require perfect information and perfect valuation, the
ends of actions are given; intentions and actions become one and the same. Once
behavior is reduced down to the product of a statistical system, the question is no longer,
'what motivates a person to behave in a particular way?' but 'how do mainstream
rationality based theories about human behavior explain why people behave the way they
do?' The end is given; whatever actions a person makes are already explained; human
behavior is rational; there is nothing left to understand. This is what opens the door for
normalizing the hedonistic, consumer-driven, industrialized, environmentally ruinous
economy of the modern world. Knight, echoing the sentiments of Veblen before him,
notes that the rationality assumption points to a fundamental, logical error underlying the
25

classical economists' normative approaches to economics. “Notoriously, they were
hedonists; their argument for liberty made it instrumental to pleasure, on the ground that
individual is a better judge than the government officials of the means to his happiness.”
(Knight 1935, 105). Knight, using the same terminology as Veblen, spots the
philosophical departure from classical understandings of morality and ethics. The endless
pursuit of maximizing pleasure is the antithesis of Smith's "virtuous" man. Classical
economists treat individual liberty as if it is an inalienable right, when, like the rest of
human existence, it is a social value in the same way institutions and communities are the
products of commonly held social values. That is not to say that individual liberty is a
corrupt value to uphold, far from it. However, since mainstream economic models
assume that maximizing individual utility is the only objectively moral way to act in the
world and that doing so will result in societally beneficial outcomes, hedonistic
consumption has become a widely treasured social value in the modern world and has
made government intervention the enemy of pro-social, utility-maximizing outcomes.
Knight concludes that the motivations of human behavior are so integrally intertwined
with societal norms and expectations, that it is impossible to treat them in scientific
terms. “[The] current standards of thinking have come under extreme domination of the
scientific ideal, which has little if any applicability to the problem” (Knight 1935, 106).
Any attempt to objectively analyze the motivations of human behavior requires
something impossible on the part of the researcher: to remove themselves from the social
context in which they live and operate. This inescapable conflict, between the desire to
know the objective and the veil which makes it impossible to do so, is not unique to the
field of economics. Knight writes that "the philosopher or methodologist cannot possibly
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take sides. The question whether economics as such should… is to be answered only by
recognition that it must be both" (Knight 1935, 106). Knight, echoing his contemporaries
in continental philosophy, recognizes the same paradox that Mill observed decades
earlier: economics uses scientific tools to explain human behavior, which cannot be fully
understood through scientific means. This is not a dead-end for the field as a whole, but,
once again, an important acknowledgment of epistemological limitations. Knight would
end up instructing some of the most influential economists of the 20th century, including
Milton Friedman and George Stigler, yet few seemed to take these limitations seriously
or incorporated them into mainstream economic thought.
Another pioneer of neoclassic theory, Irving Fisher, whose ideas built the
backbone of the life-cycle model and helped mathematize the field of economics as a
whole, was deeply conscious of the importance of behavioral factors in economic
decision making. Fisher was fully aware of the fact that his models and theories about
interest rates and money supply were only valid in a world in which everyone has
“foresight” or rational expectations. Rather than discussing the philosophical
underpinnings of normative models, Fisher bases his critique on the limitations and
biases of human psychology. Throughout his book, The Theory of Interest (1930), Fisher
uses the term "impatience" interchangeably with time preference. According to Fisher,
six components make up a person's impatience: foresight, self-control, habit, expectation
of lifespan, concern for the lives of others, and fashion (Thaler 1997). All of these factors
are, of course, subjective in nature and not accounted for by models based on rationality
assumptions. Fisher writes that in the real world, the size of income has a major effect on
someone’s impatience, “the smaller the income, the higher the preference for present over
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future income, that is the greater the impatience…” (Fisher 1930, 72). This is a direct
contradiction to the life cycle hypothesis which assumes that people rationally smooth
their consumption over their lifetimes regardless of income. Fisher attributes this
discrepancy between the models and real-life to pragmatic motivations and psychological
shortcomings in human reasoning. "The irrational aspect of the matter is often to relax
foresight and the self-control and to tempt us to 'trust the luck' of the future, if only the
all-engrossing need of the present necessities can be satisfied" (Fisher 1930, 73). In other
words, a person of little means may prioritize present utility over future utility more than
someone in the middle class out of necessity. A person struggling to afford food and
housing will not prioritize saving per the life-cycle hypothesis because the realities of
their lives will not allow for it; if someone's daily focus is on survival, having a
comfortable amount of money in a retirement account for consumption that is decades
away does not play a major role in their economic decision making today.
Fisher attributes a considerable amount of what makes up one's impatience to
pure, unexplainable irrationality, to the fact that "the future is seldom considered in its
true proportions." (Fisher 1930, 82). This is evident in our lives daily. Almost everyone
has heard stories of people procrastinating on changing the oil in their car, each time
rationalizing it as 'I can make it to the store and back' or 'the car seems like it’s running
well, so it must not need oil immediately.’ Yet this story always has the same ending: the
engine seizes, and the car owner is left with a repair bill many multiples higher than the
cost of an oil change. If humans are expert forecasters, everyone can anticipate the costs
and benefits of an oil change in relation to ruining the car and buying new engine and
then rationally decide to always keep their car's oil new, so this should never be an issue.
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Fisher uses the somewhat morose example of alcoholic working men who, “…could not
resist the lure of the saloon on the way home Saturday night, many persons cannot deny
themselves a present indolence, even when they know what the consequences will be”
(Fisher 1930, 83). Fisher identifies why mainstream models are not good at describing
the real world: people tend to be lazy and lack self-control. Human action is subject to
irrational passions, subject to the whims of partial spectators. While normative models
capture how rational agents should act with the explicit goal of maximizing their utility
over time, real human beings do not act in a way that maximizes their long-term utility.
Forecasting the balance of future consumption in relation to present consumption requires
critical thought; self-control requires will-power. No law of human behavior states people
have to participate in either, yet, as Fisher acknowledges repeatedly, mainstream
economic models, including his own, consider them to be ubiquitous. Fisher continues by
writing that no area of human life exemplifies a wholehearted embrace of selfperpetuating, irrational behavior more than fashion. He writes that the only reason the
fashion industry exists is "to stimulate men to save and become millionaires, and, on the
other hand, to stimulate millionaires to live in an ostentatious manner" and concludes that
fashion is one of the most "potent yet illusory social forces which follow the laws of
imitation" (Fisher 1930, 88). In this quote, Fisher observes the same phenomenon as
Veblen and Knight before him: a significant portion of consumer culture is based on
either acting or aspiring to act ostentatiously, in a manner which is solely focused on
gaudiness and creating envy within peers, in a manner that is not societally beneficial.
This idea is similar to the hedonist economy outlined by both Veblen and Knight, and
even echoes Adam Smith, who, nearly 200 years earlier, had written of people ruining
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themselves on “trinkets of frivolous utility.” By including these complicating factors,
these behavioral insights into his writing, Fisher implicitly admits that his own theories
on savings rates, his titular Fisher equation, is not a good description of the world (Thaler
1997).
Fisher, Knight, Veblen, Mill, and Smith come from a variety of historical eras and
ideologies, yet they all agree upon the importance of psychological and philosophical
limitations to the rationality assumptions that underpin mainstream economic theories.
The tendencies of people to value present utility over future utility, to act on passions
rather than reason, to fall victim to cognitive biases are all assumed away as ‘rational’ in
mainstream models and hedonistic consumption becomes the predominant cultural value.
Acting in the pursuit of maximizing one’s utility becomes virtuous rather than acting in
conscious self-moderation. After all, in a world of rational agents with perfect
information, everyone should account for the value of consuming today at the expense of
tomorrow. Everyone should plan for the future and consume accordingly. Even with
environmentally destructive behavior, it is assumed that suppliers can properly value the
environment, and it is assumed that the market demand for an environmentally
destructive good should reflect a price that accounts for the present and future
consumption. The market equilibrium price of nonrenewable goods, since it is arrived at
through a rational market of rational agents, should reflect the fact that they are
nonrenewable. This is how the assumptions of normative models have normalized
overconsumption and hedonism. If markets are assumed to be efficient, the market
equilibrium price and quantity of a good are the environmentally sustainable price and
quantity. The market should be behaving in perfect proportion to perfect expectations
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about the future. The propagation of hedonistic economics and a worldwide embrace of
consumer-driven, free-trade globalization becomes status quo. This has not necessarily
been a bad thing as billions of people have been able to escape poverty and standards of
living have generally risen for the last half-century. However, to argue that the spread of
neoliberalism has not left people behind and created its own, unique problems is ignorant.
The world is currently facing an unprecedented global climate change crisis, which can
trace its roots to the same failures in human rationality first identified by the economists
discussed in this chapter. Revisiting these economists and their ideas, ignored for being
too qualitative and ill-defined, is necessary for determining how economics can aid in the
fight against climate change, rather than contributing to it.

2.4 The Neoclassical Perspective
It is abundantly clear that classical economists from varying perspectives agree
that the omission of behavioral factors from mainstream economic models presents an
inescapable and dangerous obstacle to the development of economic theory. While
normative models are capable of describing how rational agents should act given a
context of incentives, they fail to describe how people act in the real world. Mainstream
models are useful at describing how people should save and consume in order to
maximize utility across their entire lifetimes, or how business owners can maximize their
profits, but there are no a priori rules of human behavior that require they act
accordingly. The consequences of confusing the abstraction speculations of normative
theory for truths of human behavior are dire; they lead to the rise of a hedonistic zeitgeist
and the normalization of unsustainable consumption. But if classical economists from
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Smith through Fisher were aware of these shortcomings, how did economics get where it
is? How has the global economy reached the point of creating and sustaining a global
ecological crisis?
The belief that profit and utility optimization models describe actual human
behavior overtook the field of economics like a tidal wave, partially at the hands of
economists already cited in this paper. Since William Stanley Jevons 1 first attempted to
mathematize the study of economics, to put it amongst the natural sciences like physics,
chemistry, and mechanics, it had been trending in an increasingly normative direction.
Smith's partial spectator receded into the background of economic thought and was
replaced by the idea that "a person procures such quantities of commodities that the final
degrees of utility of any pair of commodities are inverse as the ratios of exchange of the
commodities" (Jevons 1871, 139). Fisher, Edgeworth, von Neuman, and Morgenstern
were also amongst the mathematically inclined economists of the first half of the 20th
century, all of whom contributed to the mainstream acceptance of normative models
based on rationality assumptions as useful tools for understanding and regulating
markets. The concepts of utility and value exited the abstract dialectics of philosophers
and became the objective measures of what is good in the world, made quantifiable
through money and markets. von Neumann and Morgenstern, in their book Theory of
Games and Economic Behavior (1944), explicitly argue that mathematic models are the
only legitimate way of studying economic behavior. "We hope to establish satisfactorily,
after developing a few plausible schematizations, that the typical problems of economic

1

The Jevons Paradox, that a focus on maximizing energy production efficiency results in more, not less,
consumption of natural resources, shows that he too was well aware of the shortcomings of normative
economic theories.
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behavior become strictly identical with the mathematical notions of suitable games of
strategy" (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, 2). Throughout the book, the authors
provide laudable levels of mathematical rigor to structure their theories, notably among
them, that people maximize utility relative to a budget constraint over time. Additionally,
since economists cannot resist the temptation of drawing a parallel to another science to
support their methodology, von Neumann and Morgenstern compare the development of
economics to that of physics. Physics provides overly simplistic generalizations on the
nature of movement in the universe without providing an underlying logical
superstructure. The authors acknowledge that "mathematics has not been successful in
economics" but attribute the lack of success to "unfavorable circumstances, some of
which can be removed gradually" (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, 4). Physicists
start by modeling motion in a vacuum and then add complexity as they become aware of
it; economists can do the same but are limited by the tools which are used to measure
outcomes. There are no perfect vacuums in the real world, yet the models proved useful
in describing movement in the world. Pioneers of chemistry and physics in the 16th
century did not have the same tools as modern scientists, but that did not stop them from
being as normative and quantitative in their thinking as their technology would allow. It
is what allowed those sciences to develop new methods and learn new truths. In the same
way, the authors figure, economics will continue to develop new methodologies to get
closer and closer to the truth behind human behavior (von Neumann & Morgenstern
1944, 6). Therefore, by this line of thinking, economics isn't faced with the paradoxical
choice outlined by Mill, it must wholeheartedly embrace the scientific method, and
continually update its practices as the pursuit of scientific knowledge becomes more
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finely tuned. "The theory finally obtained must be mathematically rigorous and
conceptually general" (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, 7). This outlook is logically
sound but runs into the philosophical problems outlined by Knight decades earlier. Any
theory which is centered on utility and profit maximization is implicitly assuming that the
outcomes of human decisions are an objective measure of utility maximization, rather
than the product of dynamic social values. Economic theories based on rationality are
missing a core component of human behavior: error. Discrepancies between expected
utility and realized utility, miscalculations in appropriately consuming today and saving
for tomorrow, and widespread flaws in risk assessment based on limited information are
considered irrelevant factors. Despite these oversights, rationality assumptions continued
to dominate mainstream economic theories throughout the mid-20th century; economics
entered an era of increasingly clever normative models, and the hedonistic economy
became status quo.
In 1953, Milton Friedman wrote one of the defining essays of modern economics:
"The Methodology of Positive Economics." In this essay, Friedman acknowledges all of
the valid critiques of mainstream theory and attempts to put an end to the discussion
around the practicality of normative models. He writes that "the assumptions of 'perfect
competition' or 'perfect monopoly' said to underlie neoclassical economic theory are a
false image of reality" (Friedman 1953, 153), that this critique is used to argue that the
assumptions of classical theory are too simplistic to describe reality, and therefore,
normative theory cannot be useful. This line of thinking, according to Friedman, is sorely
mistaken. Friedman writes that economics as a positive science, in its ability to analyze
"what is" rather than "what ought to be," is aimed at identifying societal goals and road
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mapping how those goals can be obtained. This results in economists taking the same set
of data and information about a common goal and arriving at an array of solutions based
on different theories. Friedman uses the example of achieving a “livable wage” for
everyone in a society. Some economists will look at the labor market and argue that
raising the minimum wage will result in higher wages for workers at the bottom of the
income distribution; others will argue that raising the minimum wage will result in a rise
in unemployment that will outweigh the gains made in higher wages. The only way that
either of these theories can be accepted or rejected is based on empirical data. This,
according to Friedman, means that the "correct" policy "depends much less on the
progress of normative economics proper than on the progress of a positive economics
yielding conclusions that are, and deserve to be, widely accepted" (Friedman 1953, 148).
In this, Friedman appears to be conceding the point that economic theory does not justify
its own existence and is only useful to the extent that its theories can be applied to the
real world. But rather than taking this point to be critical of mainstream theories,
Friedman argues this in favor of accepting mainstream profit and utility-optimization
models of economic behavior and that the abstractions and assumptions of economic
theory are what make it useful in the first place. "A hypothesis is important if it ‘explains’
much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of
complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained…"
(Friedman 1953, 153). The point of simplistic economic models is that they do not
describe the world as it is, but that they strip away the complexity of the real world to get
to the measurable dynamics of a certain truth.
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At this point, Friedman fulfills his role as an economic historian and offers his
own comparison to the natural sciences. Friedman chooses physics (a historically popular
choice) and reiterates the metaphor of starting by simulating movement in a vacuum and
gradually introducing complexity based on context. He points out that the equation
s=1/2gt2, which describes the time it takes for an object to fall in a vacuum, is only
useful or descriptive of the real world in limited contexts: dropping a cannonball from a
tall building can be described using the general formula, but the equation is terrible at
describing how a feather will fall when dropped out of an airplane. Does the failure of the
latter scenario mean that the equation is useless? Of course not. The equation is limited
by the contexts in which it is applicable, by the contexts which are close enough to a
vacuum to be useful (Friedman 1953, 155). This changes the nature of the problem with
normative models. Their inability to describe the real world is what makes them useful,
so the question of whether or not to accept a given theory becomes ‘is this theory close
enough to reality to apply to solving this particular problem?’ By this line of thinking, the
assumption that humans live in a vacuum is undoubtedly false, but that does not mean
that normative theories are useless. Underlying assumptions do not determine the
circumstances in which a theory holds true; assumptions specify circumstances to get at
the essence of what a theory is hypothesizing.
Friedman then introduces what would become a famous metaphor for normative
economic methodology. He writes that the game of billiards involves complicated
physics and geometry, a precise understanding of angles and momentum, and
sophisticated mathematical reasoning, yet a billiards player does not need to be
mathematically inclined to excel at the game. "It seems not at all unreasonable that
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excellent predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard player made his
shots as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give the optimum
directions of travel…" (Friedman 1953, 157). The expert billiards player instead relies on
something primal, on instincts acquired through years of practice in order to achieve their
desired outcome. It makes no difference if the player has an advanced degree in
theoretical physics or if they have just been playing a lot of billiards throughout their life,
the effect is the same, otherwise, they would not be considered experts. As Friedman puts
it, the player "just figures it out" (Friedman 1953, 158). He extends this thinking to
economic methodology. Do owners of businesses bring out a whiteboard, calculate
demand curves, and then produce at a quantity at which marginal costs equal marginal
revenue? Of course not, but that misses the point of the maximization theory.
Businesspeople do not have to understand the complex equations that are behind
achieving Pareto efficiency or a Walrasian market-clearing equilibrium; they simply need
to act in their own self-interest, in a way that allows them to stay in business and this will
necessarily fulfill the outcomes predicted by Pareto and Walras.
It is only a short step from these examples to the economic hypothesis that under
a wide range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were seeking
rationally to maximize their expected return… and ahead full knowledge of the
data needed to succeed in this attempt; as if, that is, they knew the relevant cost
and demand functions, calculated marginal cost and marginal revenue… and
pushed each line of action to the point at which the relevant marginal cost and
marginal revenue were equal (Friedman 1953, 158).
Friedman justifies this line of thinking by invoking the language of social
Darwinism. He assumes that any behavior which does not act in accordance with
economic theory will be punished by the market. If businesspeople act in a way that is
inconsistent with maximizing returns, "it seems unlikely that they would remain in
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business for long" and "natural selection" will correct the error in their ways (Friedman
1953, 158). Friedman is not explicit in terms of what means the market has for correcting
behavior, but he makes it clear that the consequences are swift and dire. Sure, individual
human beings are prone to psychological blunders and are prone to short sidedness, but
those issues should not aggregate on a market scale because irrational behavior is
punished by the market. A consumer does not need to have a precise understanding of the
slopes and shapes of her indifference curves relative to a budget constraint to act as if she
wants to maximize her utility. A business owner does not need to have a full
understanding of marginal cost and revenue curves to act as if she wants to maximize her
profits. This is essentially presenting the law of revealed preferences in a new manner; it
provides a new justification for interpreting economic decisions as objective data points
of rational behavior. The general premise, 'business owners act in ways which maximize
returns for their businesses' is hard to disagree with, therefore, according to Friedman’s
logic, using models which assume consumer behavior is necessarily utility maximizing
(both in the short- and long-run) is completely reasonable. With the threat of swift market
retribution keeping people in line, "given natural selection, acceptance of the hypothesis
can be based largely on the judgment that it summarizes the conditions for survival"
(Friedman 1953, 158). Since there are enough situations in which individuals act as if
they want to maximize their profits and utility, normative economics justifies its
existence, "to 'assume' single-minded pursuit of pecuniary self-interests by employers…
works well in a wide variety of hypotheses in economics" (Friedman 1953, 164). It is
appropriate to update theory as scientific knowledge progresses, but throwing away
rationality hypotheses without having a suitable replacement is counterproductive.
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Friedman notes that a perfectly predictive model would have to incorporate things like
the character and education of individual traders, "the color of each trader's hairs and
eyes" and concludes that "achieving this kind of 'realism' is certain to render a theory
utterly useless" (Friedman 1953, 165). Thus, the issue of unrealistic assumptions is a
nonissue. It is not the objective of theory to be realistic; the focus is on finding the
contexts in which theory is applicable. Empirical contradictions to general theory do not
leave a theory useless but present limitations on the contexts in which general theory can
be applied. The assumptions of general theory are not realistic, but that's the point; the
simplified world of economic theory contains "only the forces that the hypothesis asserts
to be important" (Friedman 1953, 171). Humans may be prone to psychological
shortcomings in reasoning, but the market behaves according to strict laws of utility and
profit maximization; any behavior that deviates from rationality models will be swiftly
and mercilessly punished by the market. Over time, as people become experienced
market participants, their behavior becomes more rational, more in line with the
predictions of mainstream theory. Thus, market behavior can be confidently classified as
"rational" since irrational behavior is weeded out by the incentive structure of the free
market.
Friedman’s essay was well received by a widely sympathetic audience. He, along
with Samuelson and Modigliani, used this reasoning to formalize normative models such
as the life-cycle hypothesis, permanent income hypothesis, and the discounted utility
model (Thaler 2015, 98). The takeaway of these models: markets achieve societally
beneficial outcomes because markets are assumed to be efficient in the long run. The
Chicago school of economics, which preached the gospel of laissez-faire government
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regulation and economic growth through profit maximization, became the prevailing
philosophy of economic development. Friedman does not deny the existence of Smith's
"partial spectator", but greatly diminishes its role in economic decision making. As long
as the impartial spectator is making enough of the decision enough of the time,
mainstream theories remain entirely valid. Throughout the proceeding decades,
economists such as Hicks, Arrow, and Samuelson, despite coming from "different sides
of the aisle", all continued in the proud tradition of mathematizing economics based on
rationality assumptions. Psychological factors were considered to be true but
insignificant; normative thinking became status quo.

2.5 Behavioral Beginnings
Starting with Herbert Simon in the 1950s and followed by Kahneman, Tversky,
Thaler, and others in the 1970s and 80s, several economists and psychologists attacked
Friedman and his Chicago School contemporaries for being too quick to explain away
role of human psychology and its impact on economic decision making. Instead, they
argued that the 'errors' of human rationality do not cancel out on a market level; they
result in systematic market failures and help explain phenomena such as housing market
bubbles, unsustainably low savings rates, and the perpetuation of global climate change.
Friedman's ideas seem logically sound, but he also introduced new assumptions about the
efficiency of market incentives and disregarded the question of whether maximizing
profits and utility is desirable or ethical. Addressing this issue is at the core of solving the
climate crisis.
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Herbert Simon, an early proponent for incorporating psychology into economics,
wrote one of the earliest critiques of Friedman's essay. Simon observes that Friedman's
arguments pick and choose what is convenient in the methodology of natural sciences
without providing a clear connection to economics. Essentially, mainstream approaches
can be boiled down into three propositions:
1. Business owners want to maximize their profits.
2. Business owners know the course of action necessary to maximize their profits.
3. Observed market prices and quantities maximize profits across the entire market
(Simon 1963, 180).

The same logic, applied to consumers, yields similar conclusions:
1. Economic agents want to optimize their long-term utility subject to a budget.
2. Actors in the market know the course of action necessary optimize their utility.
3. Observed market prices and quantities maximize consumers' long-term utility.

According to Simon, in arguing for a theory consisting of these three arguments,
"Friedman asserts that it doesn't matter if [1] and [2] are false, provided [3] is true"
(Simon 1963, 180). This line of thinking relies on the assumption that [3] is empirically
tested and observable and that [1] and [2] are impossible to observe. This, too, is absurd
since utility is an inherently subjective concept and testing profit maximization requires
immaterial counterfactuals. Economics, yet again, ends up in a self-justifying tautology in
which there is no differentiation between ends and means, between intentions and
consequences. The observable actions of businesses and consumers are necessarily
rational because of the assumption that markets reward rational behavior and punish
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irrational behavior; people who act irrationally quickly learn to act rationally (although
the consequences of not doing so are left ambiguous). Simon continues by taking issue
with Friedman's baseless comparison of economics to physics. "Was Galileo also guilty
of using the invalid principle of unreality? I think not. I think he was interested in the
behavior in perfect vacuums not because there aren't any in the real world, but because
the real world sometimes sufficiently approximates them" (Simon 1963, 181). Simon
takes Friedman's argument and flips it on its head. Astrophysicists are justified in
creating models in vacuums because approximate vacuums actually exist and are directly
observable. Galileo had no concept of relativity and calculus was in its infancy when he
upended the classical understanding of the solar system, however, the simplifying
assumptions he made were justifiable because observable phenomena were close enough
to his general theory. The same cannot be said about rationality assumptions. Perhaps
there was a point in human history when something resembling perfect competition
actually existed, but in the modern globalized world, using perfect competition as the
'vacuum' though which to analyze economic behavior is to completely disregard reality.
"Unreality of premises is not a virtue in scientific theory; it is a necessary evil – a
concession to the finite computing capacity of the scientist…" (Simon 1963, 181). This is
at the center of Simon’s argument: consumers, producers, and "objective" social
scientists are all subject to the limitations of human computing abilities. Even if
consumers are acting as if they want to maximize their utility, the realities of human
psychology guarantee they will miscalculate. Even if producers are acting as if they want
to maximize profits, risk preference and errors in forecasting guarantee they will fail.
This idea, which Simon dubbed "bounded rationality", was a radical departure from the
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conclusions mainstream economic thought, yet it closely resembles Smith's "partial
spectator", first theorized 200 years before the Simon v. Friedman debate.
Simon concludes his essay by pointing out a dangerous implication of Friedman's
arguments: there is no discernable difference between "not measurable" and
"unimportant." Friedman explains that the power of normative thought lies in its ability to
understand phenomena through "only the forces that the hypothesis asserts to be
important." But this implies that the forces which are not included in the theories are
necessarily unimportant, which provides a self-justifying reason to omit human
psychology from mainstream economic models. According to Simon, this is a critical
mistake, and his work in economics, psychology, and political science started the
momentum for a behavioral revolution. Simon wanted to shift the model of economic
thought away from "[t]he rational man of economics" who is a "maximizer" and "who
will settle for nothing less than the best" and towards the role of the partial spectator, who
is compulsive, bad at math, and good at disguising itself as rational. Economists, two
centuries after they were first instructed to do so, started to grapple with the behavioral
roots of human decision-making. Simon, like Smith, Mill, and Knight, argues that error is
an integral component of human decision-making, both within and well beyond the realm
of economic choice.
Economists have always been aware of the importance of psychology in economic
decision-making. Adam Smith, the inventor of the invisible hand, wrote extensively
about the influence of our "partial spectators" who frequently convince us to act in a way
that is against our best interests. The partial spectator does not have free reign over our
actions, as we consult the "impartial spectator" to judge past actions, but Smith makes it
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clear that the tendency to appease the partial spectator "is the source of half the disorders
of human life." These warnings were heeded by many classical economists including
Mill, Veblen, Knight, and Fisher. These economists, especially Veblen and Knight,
emphasize not only that humans are deeply irrational beings, but also that building
models based on the assumption humans are rational has alarming consequences. Despite
these warnings, economics evolved in a hyper-normative direction in which the
homogenous agents in a market behave according to rational thought and in the
unhampered pursuit of maximization. Producers produce to maximize profits; consumers
consume to maximize utility. Producers do not need to calculate marginal revenue and
marginal costs in order to act as if they can; consumers do not need to have perfect
knowledge of their utility preferences in order to act as if they do. Anyone acting
irrationally faces the rigid retribution of the free market and will act rationally in the
future. However, this justification of using rationality models introduces new
assumptions to those models and does not address the core philosophical issue or hyper
normalizing economic models. First, the justification of mainstream models lies on the
assumption that markets quickly and efficiently correct irrational behavior like a strict
teacher. Secondly, this justification does not address the philosophical issues first
identified by Mill and expanded upon by Knight and Veblen. If actions and intentions are
treated as though they exist in perfect harmony, if people’s consumption behavior is
necessarily rational, utility-maximizing behavior, and the behavior of business owners is
necessarily rational, profit-maximizing behavior, if there is no differentiation between
how one should behave and how one actually behaves, hedonism becomes the
predominant societal doctrine. This exposes how economics has and continues to directly
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contribute to global climate change: the modern globalized economy is emitting carbon
well beyond a sustainable level, yet market equilibrium prices are considered to be
rational! Since markets are efficient, the market price is supposed to reflect
environmental costs, yet economic tools for calculating and correcting externalities have
not led to ecologically sustainable outcomes. If economists want to aid in the fight
against climate change rather than contribute to it, behavioral insights need to come back
to center stage. Mainstream economic theory provides a thorough framework through
which we can understand our impartial spectators, but that is only half of the story.
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Chapter 3: Refocus on Behavior
3.1 Behavioral Deviations
In the 1970s and 80s, largely influenced by Simon’s idea of bounded rationality,
social scientists from various backgrounds started to notice of the limitations of
mainstream economic models. In the early 70s, a pair of Israeli psychologists, Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, started to test systematic deviations in human behavior
from mainstream predictions, and their ideas inspired a new offshoot of economic study:
behavioral economics. Friedman argues that people will maximize utility by acting as if
they want to optimize consumption; Kahneman and Tversky argue that people are terrible
at acting as if they want to optimize consumption. Mainstream neoclassical economists
contend that expert billiards players do not need to understand geometry and physics in
order to act as if they do; behavioral economists argue that humans are terrible at playing
billiards (Thaler 1981). According to behavioralists, people’s preferences are not well
ordered and stable, they are dynamic and influenced by arbitrary queues. Since
Kahneman and Tversky started publishing their research, several economists including
Thaler, Lowenstein, and Chetty, have contributed to a growing body of literature
revealing systematic failures in rational choice. These errors do not ‘cancel out’ at a
market scale; they create and amplify wide-scale market failures; they are consistent,
predictable, and exploitable. Many outcomes assumed to be rational utility-maximizing
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behavior by neoclassical models are, in reality, the opposite. This allows unsustainable,
hedonistic consumption to be branded as societally beneficial behavior and subsequently
normalized. Therefore, the denial of behavioral biases’ profound effects on markets has
directly contributed to a societal tolerance of untenable levels of carbon emissions.
Behavioral economists’ conclusions compel a critical review of the role governments
play in markets and how to achieve sustainable social and ecological outcomes through
public policy.
One of the heuristics that Kahneman and Tversky first identified was the
“availability heuristic,” or the idea that people do not try to use the most objective
information when making predictions: they use the most readily accessible information.
In other words, when judging the probability of a hypothetical outcome, humans base
their estimates on how easily similar instances come to mind (Kahneman 2011, 425). The
availability heuristic, or availability bias, results in consistent misjudgments about the
world and how to act within it. This bias also results in small sample sizes or irrelevant
data having a large influence on behavior. Researchers found that people will frequently
make “confident estimations about the future based on little or no knowledge and will
frequently base their estimates on arbitrary queues” (Kahneman 2011, 429). Availability
bias extends itself into numerous areas of life and is the cause of stereotyping and
anchoring effects. Kahneman notes that the human brain understands the world in
generalities, and that this is not always a malicious thing. For example, a hiker wandering
in the woods may hold the belief ‘all bears are dangerous’, and while it is not technically
true, the stereotype is useful for survival. Human rationality is bounded; critical thought
is costly, so working in generalizations allows the hiker’s brain to save energy and focus
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on other tasks like not getting lost. While stereotyping is a useful survival tactic, it also
leads to gross mischaracterizations of events and inaccurate predictions about the future.
The anchoring effect "occurs when people consider a particular value for an unknown
quantity before estimating the quantity" (Kahneman 2011, 119). In several experiments,
researchers manipulated subjects' answers to trivia questions, predictions about the
future, and willingness to pay responses when valuing ecological processes with great
success using arbitrary anchors. This was true even when the anchor was an obviously
absurd or unrelated number. In one study, researchers asked people for estimations of
Gandhi’s age upon his death. One group was asked the absurd question, “was Gandhi
older than 144 years old when he died?” before being asked for their own estimates, and
a second group was asked, “was Gandhi older than 34 years old when he died?” before
being asked for estimates. The former group predicted a significantly higher age than the
latter, despite both groups being fully conscious that the anchoring number was absurd
(Kahneman 2011, 122). This is one innocuous example of the anchoring effect, but it
shows the mailability of human judgment on both conscious and subconscious levels.
Due to mental shortcuts like stereotyping and anchoring, human beings, across the board,
make poor predictions about the future due to poor interpretations of the past and
incomplete interpretations of the present. Mainstream models assume that actors within a
market are operating on the same basic set of objective facts; availability bias shows that
judgments and decisions do not need to be based in fact at all. This puts salience at the
center of economic decision-making. People shape their ethical beliefs based on the
information that is most available, not based on what is true or optimal. People’s risk
assessment is based on arbitrary data points, and this means risk is subjective and
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arguably unmeasurable. Salient and dramatic outcomes play an outsized role in risk
assessment, which results in wide discrepancies between public perceptions and
quantifiable facts.
Kahneman and Tversky's early work on the availability heuristic and the
predictable biases it creates inspired a new generation of economists to develop a new
economic framework that incorporates rationally bounded human beings into the center
of its models, flaws and all. Kahneman and Tversky formalized their findings into the
Two-System Framework, in which people make decisions through two cognitive systems
which are sometimes at odds with each other. System 1 thinks quickly and impulsively;
System 2 “is in charge of self-control” (Kahneman 2011, 26). System 1 is automatic, and
System 2 is reflexive (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). This language is remarkably similar to
that of Adam Smith who wrote about people containing both “partial” and “impartial”
spectators; the partial spectator prone to succumbing to the whims of irrational
passions—the impartial spectator in charge of judging past actions and keeping long term
goals in sight. In this way, the wave of behavioral economics was not spontaneous; it was
long overdue. Economists started to notice Smith's ideas and began to accept that only
through incorporating real human behavior can economics ensure its usefulness at
addressing global problems.

3.2 Errors in Rationality and Their Contribution to Carbon Emissions
Since Kahneman and Tversky’s early research, there has been an explosion of
research investigating the role of behavioral biases in decision making. Speaking broadly,
behavioral economists identified three bounds of human psychology: bounded rationality,
49

bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest (Thaler 2015, 258). These boundaries have
numerous consequences, affecting both economic and non-economic decision-making.
Take the availability heuristic for example. People’s tendency to base their
predictions on the most salient information rather than the most accurate information has
dramatic effects on how people behave. People make confident estimations about the
future based on little or no knowledge and frequently base estimates on arbitrary
contextual clues (Kahneman 2011, 130). This means people overestimate the likelihood
of salient, attention-grabbing events and underestimate the likelihood of invisible
outcomes; this has significant effects on people’s risk assessments and aids in the
normalization of hedonism. A consistent finding across the literature is that people
overestimate the likelihood of rare, eye-catching events. In one study, 80% of
respondents judged accidental death to be more likely than death by stroke, despite
strokes causing twice as many deaths as all accidents combined. Respondents believed
that death by disease and by accident to be roughly equal, yet in reality, death by disease
is 18 times as likely as an accidental death. Tornadoes were predicted to be bigger killers
than asthma, but asthma causes 20 times as many deaths as tornadoes (Lichtenstein et al.
1978). These misperceptions of risk are directly attributable to availability bias and
exemplify the power of media coverage in shaping public perceptions (Kahneman 2011,
138). This contributes to climate change on a couple of levels. It helps explain why 20%
of the American population does not believe human activity is contributing to global
climate change despite near-unanimous acceptance amongst climate scientists that
climate change is primarily caused by human activity (Pew 2019). Unless people are
deliberately going out of their way to gather the most objective information on climate
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science, they tend to blindly accept whatever data is most readily accessible. Availability
bias is not the only explanation of climate denialism, but it does help explain why climate
denialism persists despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.
The other way that availability bias contributes to climate change is by making us
underestimate the likelihood of non-salient events. Since many of the catastrophic
outcomes of climate change are decades away, and many of the current effects of climate
change occur far away from centers human civilization, the risks of climate change are
fallaciously diminished in our collective social consciousness. "The human mind does not
deal well with nonevents” (Kahneman 2011, 200) and many of the existential threats
climate change poses are, for the time being, nonevents. The list of potential outcomes of
climate change is extensive. Rising oceans result in the reduction of land area, especially
beaches and wetlands, and in the potential displacement of hundreds of millions of
people. As carbon emissions continue to be absorbed by oceans, ocean acidification
begins disrupting the long-term feasibility of marine ecosystems. Rising temperatures
result in the loss of species and forests, the disruption of water supplies and agriculture,
and increased deaths due to heatwaves and tropical diseases. In addition to these basic
predictable outcomes, there are a plethora of unknown effects of climate change: weather
patterns will change, and extreme weather like tornadoes and hurricanes may become
more frequent; potential shifts in the Atlantic Gulf Stream could change Europe’s climate
into current day Alaska’s; the melting permafrost may result in rapid increases in
methane emissions and accelerate climate change beyond hope of human intervention
(Harris & Roach 2018, 326). All of these outcomes seem like pitches for bad sci-fi
movies, yet they are also fairly likely without radical transformations in carbon-emitting
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behavior. So why isn't there a global panic and movement away from extreme
consumerism? Why is the political movement behind enviornmentally sustainable growth
considered fringe if climate change truly presents an existential threat to the planet and
society as we know it? Availability bias helps answer these questions. Many of the
cataclysmic events outlined above have not yet happened, other events are invisible. It is
impossible for people to fully grasp the likelihood of an event that has never happened
before for precisely that reason: it has never happened before. The threat of Europe's
climate resembling that of current-day Alaska is unthinkable because, throughout modern
history, Europe's climate has never resembled Alaska’s. An increase in deaths due to
heatwaves is not as attention-grabbing as a violent attack, so people overestimate the
likelihood of the latter and ignore the former. Another important component of climate
change is that not all areas are affected equally. Many of the most noticeable effects of
climate change are occurring far away from most people’s day-to-day lives. The areas of
permafrost in Siberia and the Northwest Territory are sparsely populated, and the effects
of its thaw are essentially invisible, therefore, the risks are underestimated. Island nations
like Kiribati and Tuvalu, whose respective carbon emissions are amongst the lowest in
the world, are beginning to disappear as ocean levels rise, but are located in remote
regions with relatively small populations (Rytz 2018). The leaders of island nations have
been pleading to developing countries to cut back on carbon emissions for decades to no
avail. In 1997, the former president of Kiribati described their predicament like being
“ants” in elephants’ drinking water. “The problem isn’t the ants’ behavior. It’s a problem
of how to convince elephants to be more gentle” (Kristof 1997). The Pacific Ocean
slowly swallowing the homelands of pacific islanders is a slow, untheatrical tragedy that
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will never garner the same media attention as celebrity gossip, a provocative tweet, or
armed conflict. People in developed countries (Americans in particular) consume at a rate
that is well beyond ecological limits because the negative effects of excessive
consumption are, for the time being, felt by people other than themselves. Since salience
shapes our beliefs around costs and benefits, it is easy to normalize excessive energy
consumption, car and plane travel, and other carbon-emitting activities because the
effects are non-salient to consumers. Thaler and Sunstein, who coauthored many studies
with Kahneman and Tversky, sum it up. "The underlying problem is that energy is
invisible, so people do not know when they are using a lot of it" (Thaler & Sunstein 2008,
196). Availability bias undermines the prospect of the rational consumer; consumers
cannot possibly act rationally due to human psychology. Any consumer acting as if they
want to maximize their utility will inevitably draw false conclusions about the costs and
benefits of their actions due to arbitrary queues they pick up from the environment.
Someone might overestimate the possibility of being attacked by an axe murderer after
watching a horror movie on an international flight and be completely blind to the
environmentally detrimental effects of taking the flight in the first place.

3.3 Mis-forecasting Future Utility
The availability heuristic undoubtedly aids in explaining why markets tolerate and
encourage conspicuous consumption, but it is far from the only systemic limitation of
human psychology that contributes to climate change. A number of studies have revealed
people’s inability to forecast accurately future utility. Over 200 years after Smith first
wrote of people ruining themselves by spending all their money on “trinkets of frivolous
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utility,” and 150 years after Mill wrote of “discrepancies between anticipations and the
actual fact,” economists finally started to take notice of peoples’ forecasting
inadequacies. Friedman argued that people need to act as if they want to optimize their
utility in order to accomplish their goal; behavioralists argue that people do not act as if
they want to optimize their utility, and even when they do, they inevitably fail.
Saving habits in the United States are an obvious example of systematic failure to
optimize long-term utility. According to the Life-Cycle Hypothesis, people set aside a
certain percentage of their income in savings to ensure they will have money to continue
consuming after they have stopped earning a wage. The logic is simple: people should
start retirement accounts because everyone wants to retire. Behavioral analysis has shown
that while people should save to optimize long-term utility, few succeed. Studies estimate
that between 80-85% of people are “passive” savers (Chetty 2015) and that defaults have
a dramatic effect on people’s saving behavior. In one study, researchers found that only
10% of employees contributed to a 401(k) plan when non-enrollment was the default
option upon accepting the job. This number increases over time, with around 50% of
employees enrolling in the plan after 2 years, but suboptimal saving behavior is normal
because a lot of people do not actively monitor and optimize their saving behavior. This
problem was easily corrected by automatically enrolling employees in the 401(k) plans
and giving them the option to opt-out of contributing. The opt-out employees saw an 8085% participation rate which stayed constant across time and income levels (Madrian &
Shea 2001). How is this possible? Both groups of employees are presented with the same
fundamental problem: how much to contribute to a 401(k), yet both groups seemed to
revert to a ‘default is best’ heuristic rather than actively optimizing their saving habits. To
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put it another way, 80% of people "chose" the default saving rate regardless of the
optimal or 'correct' rate. This resulted in one group of employees adopting healthy saving
habits, and the other dramatically under-saving and undervaluing their future utility.
Smith wrote that we tend to undervalue our utility “ten years hence” and 21 st-century
economists confirmed this notion. Left to our own devices, we tend to consume today at
the expense of tomorrow.
Another reason for systematic discrepancies between expected and realized utility
is due to projection bias, or the tendency to overweight current emotional states when
making decisions. This is such a universally understandable concept that there is a term
for making such a decision: the impulse buy. There is evidence of projection bias in the
market: one study showed that warm clothes bought on cold days are more likely to be
returned than warm clothes bought on other days (Kahneman & Thaler 2006). People
step into the cold, have an immediate emotional reaction, and end up purchasing clothes
they end up not wanting or needing. The ramifications of market-wide projection bias are
another source of ostentatious, unsustainable consumer behavior. It leads to widespread
"miswanting” (which is impossible under the assumptions of revealed preference) and
“makes us prone to exaggerate the effect of significant purchases or changed
circumstances on our future well-being” (Kahneman 2011, 406). This research challenges
the neoclassical assumption that rational agents with stable, well-defined preferences
interact in a marketplace to find a market-clearing price and quantity. "[F]orecasts of
future hedonic and emotional states are anchored in the current emotional and
motivational state” (Kahneman & Thaler 2006). When people approach a decision while
in a heightened emotional state, rational considerations fall by the wayside, and people
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are prone to making senseless decisions. One obvious example is the emotional
motivation of craving. “Craving, like depression, not only motivates certain behaviors,
but it crowds out virtually all considerations,” and in the most extreme circumstances,
“nourishment, sleep, money, loved ones, responsibility, and survival lose all
significance” (Camerer 2003). Craving manifests itself on several levels; there are the
noticeable examples of drug and alcohol addiction, but it also creates a more societally
pervasive focusing illusion, or the idea that “nothing in life is as important as you think it
is when you are thinking about it” (Kahneman 2011, 402). People overestimate the
gained utility from buying a new car or a new house. Research has shown that people buy
more food if they are hungry while shopping and buy less food if given a muffin before
entering the store (Gilbert et al. 2002). The allure of sugary, high-fat foods is diminished
if the emotions that accompany hunger are reduced. The focusing illusion also makes us
prone to misjudge our own happiness, as well as the happiness of people around us based
on arbitrary anchors (Kahneman 2011, 404). This creates a detrimental cycle in which
people underestimate their own happiness relative to others, become hyper-focused on
compensating for this gap through additional consumption, end up disappointed that the
additional consumption did not actually result in higher utility, and thus, start the cycle
over again. On a societal scale, gold-plating and competitive consumption is evident in
television commercials and on every social media app. People feel envious of their
friends with new, shiny, expensive things and become convinced they must consume the
same things to be as happy as their peers. When people are inevitably disappointed that
buying a second home, new sports car, Wi-Fi-enabled stationary bicycle, golf vacation in
the Caribbean, or third private plane did not make them as happy as expected, they
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compensate with even more consumption. Kahneman identifies the underlying danger of
the focusing illusion, "it makes us prone to exaggerate the effect of significant purchases
or changed circumstances on our future well-being" (Kahneman 2011, 406). The focusing
illusion distorts the valuations of various goods and prices become reliant on arbitrary
factors. We end up building a capitalistic Tower of Babel, in which everyone is trying to
out consume each other with no limit or goal in mind. In this way, accepting peoples’
consumption choices as rational ignores a key component of human psychology: even if
people act as if they want to optimize their utility, they are inevitably terrible at doing so.
Therefore, accepting revealed preferences as rational results in the societal acceptance of
hedonism and unsustainable carbon-emitting behavior.
In addition to projection bias, people fail to accurately forecast utility due to the
planning fallacy. The planning fallacy is responsible for the difference between what we
plan to do and what we actually do. Researchers have consistently found that people's
forecasts of personal projects tend to be unrealistically close to best-case scenarios
(Kahneman 2011, 250). The list of examples is extensive. A 2011 study of farmers in
Kenya found that while 97% of farmers said they planned to use fertilizer on their fields
in the upcoming year, only 37% actually fertilized their crops, which resulted in
suboptimal crop yields (Duflo et al. 2011). Predictably, differences between the planner
and the doer result in systematic suboptimal outcomes. Irrational optimism is a
significant source of unnecessary risk-taking in the market. Only 35% of small businesses
in America survive 5 years, yet entrepreneurs estimated this number to be around 60%.
Furthermore, four in five entrepreneurs gave themselves at least a 70% chance of
succeeding, with one in three entrepreneurs giving themselves a 0% chance of failure
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(Cooper 1988). Of course, these results aren’t necessarily surprising, what’s the point of
starting a business if you believe it is going to fail? But it does reveal the hopelessly
romantic side of human psychology; we cannot help but things will work out, that we are
the exception to the rule. A young entrepreneur may think, ‘sure only 1 in 3 businesses
survives at least 5 years, but my idea is good, and that’s what separates me from everyone
else.’ According to neoclassical models, people make risks based on market information
and respond quickly to failure; behavioral research suggests this is not the case. Studies
of inventors who were told their inventions had a minuscule chance at success have
shown that only around one-half of the inventors gave up on their inventions, despite
having been told their chances of success are only around 1%. “Evidence suggests that
optimism is widespread, stubborn, and costly” (Kahneman 2011, 257). This, combined
with irrational entrepreneurial optimism results, shows that unlike Friedman's world, in
which irrational market behavior is punished and corrected, the real market does not
incentivize people to act rationally, it capitalizes on their optimism bias to keep the
capitalist engine running smoothly. The market is full of irrationally optimistic people
with failing businesses and bad ideas who choose to persevere in the face of adversity
rather than accept that their idea is bad. The true probabilities of gains and losses are
unknowable, so people overestimate the probability of gains and underestimate that of
losses. Subsequently, the planning fallacy results in artificially high levels of market risk.
The gap between the far-sighted, level-headed ‘planner’ and the short-sighted, lazy,
compulsive ‘doer’ is remarkably similar to the two-agent model proposed by Smith in
Theory of Moral Sentiments. It is important to work in a framework in which decisions
and actions, while contemplated and acted out by an individual human being, are being
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influenced by two countervailing forces. In fact, to not view human decision-making in
this framework is to deny the concept of 'self-control' (Thaler 1981, 294). Taken together,
the planning fallacy and projection bias create a snowball effect in their contribution to
global climate change. The planning fallacy results in unreasonably high levels of risky
behavior to sustain untenable levels of consumption: consumption, which is propped up
by projection bias, resulting in a hedonic race against ourselves with no goal or finish
line.
The last behavioral insight which directly contributes to climate change is status
quo bias, which is the tendency to go along with the status quo rather than actively
monitoring, optimizing, and re-optimizing consumption. The literature focused on status
quo bias is wide ranging. College students tend to sit in the same seat every day even
without a seating chart (Thaler 2015, 8). As mentioned before, 80% of savers were shown
to be “passive savers” who blindly followed the default (status-quo) option because the
cost of keeping everything the same is perceived to be very low (Camerer 2003).
"Generally, the status quo serves as a reference point; people conserve on cognitive effort
by evaluating new consumption alternatives in isolation, rather than by integrating them
with existing plans" (Lowenstein & Prelec 1992). A series of studies across politics, food
consumption, city planning, and financial market behavior found that “subjects…
adhered to status quo choices more frequently than would be predicted by the canonical
model” (Samuelson 1988). One illustrative example is New Coke. New Coke performed
better in blind taste tests than traditional Coke, yet people changed their preferences after
finding out that it was a departure from the status quo (Samuelson 1988). The
environmental implications of status quo bias are perhaps the most obvious of all the
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aforementioned behavioral biases. Since the status quo, especially in America, is to emit
carbon at a rate well beyond ecological limits, we fail to perceive the costs of non-action.
To complicate things further, public education campaigns will not be enough to change
hearts and minds. Research has shown that people go out of their way to keep their heads
in the sand, an idea called strategic self-ignorance. Strategic self-ignorance is the use of
ignorance as an excuse to over-indulge in pleasurable activities that may be harmful to
one’s future self (Thunstrom et al 2016). One study on food information and its effect on
consumption showed that a majority of participants actively chose to ignore the
information about the health risks of food they were about to consume. Additionally,
those who intentionally ignored the health information consumed significantly more than
those who chose to educate themselves about the food options (Thunstrom et al. 2016).
Humans are comfort creatures; we actively lie to ourselves to justify hedonistic behavior.
Even when presented with relevant information, people actively ignore that information if
it intervenes in over-indulgent hedonic behavior. This means that informing people about
the facts and risks of climate change will not be sufficient to change social attitudes
towards a green future. It is also necessary to actively fight against misinformation to
combat people’s availability bias and strategic self-ignorance.
The heuristics and biases listed in this chapter are a small portion of all the biases
that have been studied by behavioral economists, but they are arguably the most
important biases that systematically contribute to the normalization of conspicuous
hedonistic consumption and the ongoing climate crisis. Many of the effects of climate
change remain invisible from most Americans’ day-to-day lives. Underestimating the
risks of invisible outcomes, falling victim to status quo bias, and falling into the hedonist
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trap created by projection bias continues to worsen climate change, and we cannot
propose effective solutions without acknowledging the role these biases play in behavior
and shaping cultural norms. The empirical problems of revealed preference theory show
that relying on mainstream models, which have homogenous rational agents at their core,
is not only inaccurate, but also surreptitiously destructive. Policymakers aiming to curb
carbon emissions must therefore reevaluate conclusions founded on economic rationality.
Behavioral insights and human psychology must play an integral role in any economic
proposal for solving climate change because they open economics up to a new set of
policy tools that provide more cost-effective solutions than traditional neoclassical
economic models.
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Chapter 4: What Works?
We have established how the omission of behavioral insights from economic
theory has contributed to the rapidity of global climate change, but as Friedman pointed
out, identifying problems without a proposed solution is counterproductive. This chapter
reviews various approaches to solving climate change including neoclassical approaches
in addition to alternatives proposed by the behavioralist and ecological viewpoints. The
validity of these approaches is measured on both empirical and philosophical grounds.
The evidence is overwhelming: when attempting to change people's habits to encourage
more pro-social behavior, behavioral interventions tend to be significantly more costeffective than neoclassical solutions. Several studies have shown that mainstream theory
fails to capture the true value of the ecological processes, that the price mechanism is less
effective at influencing behavior than normative theory predicts, and that low-cost
behavioral interventions can be significantly more successful at achieving pro-social
behavior.

4.1 What Should Have Worked (but Hasn’t)?
A core premise of neoclassical theory is that people respond to incentives. If the
price of something goes up, people consume less of it, and vise visa. Therefore, the
primary tool neoclassical theories have to combat climate change is the price mechanism.
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Everything, including nonmarket goods, is valued and monetized, then incentives take
over to guide markets to achieve efficient outcomes. Neoclassical economists readily
admit that there are negative externalities coupled with carbon-emitting development, but
they also contend that the costs associated with these externalities can be accurately
measured and accounted for. There is a general acceptance of using cost-benefit-analysis
(CBA) to understand and solve a wide array of human problems, including the climate
crisis. The conceit of CBA is pretty simple: all the forecasted costs and benefits of a
certain course of action are weighed against each other, and decisions are made in pursuit
of optimizing expected net benefits. If the costs outweigh the benefits, reevaluate your
options; if the benefits outweigh the costs, green light the proposal. In a market full of
rational agents operating on perfect information, this methodology is sound, but as has
been repeatedly showcased, people do not act rationally or on accurate information. CBA
is based on the assumption that economic tools provide an accurate valuation of
environmental processes and is the justification for environmentally degrading
development. More than half of all carbon emissions released since the 18th century have
been released since 1988, well past the point when environmentalists started bringing
attention to the troubling climate trends associated with high carbon emissions (Frumhoff
2014).
CBA, when done correctly, should maximize benefits to society while minimizing
costs. This should result in societally beneficial outcomes. So why hasn’t it? Why do
carbon emissions continue to rise, oceans continue to acidify, fields of permafrost
continue to melt, and extreme weather events continue to intensify? CBA carries some of
the blame. CBA assumes that survey methods can accurately measure how much people
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value the environment. Willingness to pay (WTP) measures are one example. WTP
measures, as the name implies, attempt to capture the value of environmental goods
(clean air for example) by asking people how much they are willing to pay for them.
Opposite of WTP measures are willingness to accept (WTA) measures. WTA measures
attempt to capture the value of environmental goods by asking people how much they are
required to be compensated to accept environmental destruction. For example, if a utility
commission is deciding whether or not to build a new fossil fuel-run power plant, it may
ask people living in the area how much they would have to be compensated to accept the
environmental degradation. Both the WTP and WTA measures are accepted as
mainstream methods of accurately capturing the value of environmental processes and
are even treated as interchangeable ways to measure the value of the environment
(Knetsch 1991). Several studies have thrown the practice of treating WTP and WTA
measures interchangeably into question. Theoretically, the amount people are willing to
give up to avoid the loss of a resource should be equivalent to the amount of money they
require to accept it. Yet empirical studies show that using these two methods to value the
exact same piece of the environment yields vastly different estimates. Asking people
'how much are you willing to pay to prevent a coal plant from being built down the road?'
results in a significantly lower answer than asking 'how much will the coal company need
to pay you to build a new plant down the week?' A series of studies have shown that
WTA measures of value are consistently 3 to 9 times larger than WTP measures (Knetsch
1991). These differences reveal a key issue with using survey results to determine
environmental value: there is no consideration of wealth distribution. This oversight has
other repercussions. Because WTP measures are inherently coupled with income, using
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WTP to value the environment gives disproportionate weight to the preferences of highincome individuals. For instance, say there is a town next to a forest with three citizens,
one of whom is considerably wealthier than the other two. Let's say the wealthy
individual is willing to pay $10,000 to cut down the forest and turn it into lumber, while
the other two residents are each willing to pay $1,000 to prevent this development.
Speaking democratically, the forest should be preserved because a majority of the town
opposes the development; but according to CBA, the failure to cut down the forest results
in a societal net loss of $8,000. This inherent wealth bias is baked into the methodology
of CBA and explains the modern predilection for environmentally degrading
development (Frank 2000). Because the opinions of people and nations with high levels
of capital are valued above those of small developing countries, the outcomes of these
people are cast aside. The United States, Canada, China, and other high carbon-emitting
countries can sit and watch Pacific islands disappear into the ocean while hiding behind
the moral shield of CBA because CBA inherently favors rich individuals and developed
countries.
Another shortcoming of CBA is its reliance on a discount rate to determine
present and future values. Discount rates are founded on a logical premise: due to
inflation, a $100 cost today should not be valued the same as a $100 cost in 10 years.
Therefore, projected costs and benefits should be discounted relative to current costs and
benefits. Discount rates are used to project benefits and costs across time and are
therefore critical in the CBA process. The first methodological issue is that due to the
mathematical structure of discount rates, the future is only considered when the discount
rate is incredibly low. For example, if the discount rate is 5%, it is not worth investing
65

even $10 today to avoid a $100 loss 50 years in the future (Harris & Roach 154). A
higher discount rate results in even less weight to future costs and benefits, so ensuring a
low discount rate is low is crucial when addressing environmental issues. Also,
behavioral studies have shown that people do not discount future utility in a manner that
is consistent with neoclassical theory. The results of several experiments suggest that
people do not discount future costs and benefits exponentially, as discount rate models
assume, but hyperbolically (Frank 2000, 927). This means that people are much more
prone to present bias, that is, are prone to discounting the future much more dramatically
than is modeled through discount rates. This manifests itself in policy decisions in
troubling ways. When deciding between expanding existing fracking capacity and
investing in green technology, we underestimate benefits when they are only realized in
the long term. Because fracking provides relatively cheap oil to sustain an infrastructure
already dependent on fossil fuels and the benefits of investing in green alternatives are
realized in the long run, our flawed psychology underplays the costs of destroying the
environment. We choose a small, short-term benefit over a large, long-term benefit and
this helps explain how untenable carbon consumption has been normalized. Thus, due to
the combination of inflation rates inherently devaluing the future and the human tendency
to hyperbolically discount future utility, CBA fails at weighing future costs and benefits
in their true proportions (Frank 200, 928).
In addition to identifying methodological shortcomings, numerous studies have
shown that the price mechanism is inadequate at achieving carbon-cutting objectives. For
example, one study found that Carbon Cap and Trade programs, which are reliant on
market forces to find the price of carbon, have not reduced carbon emissions rapidly
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enough to meet the goals put forth by the Paris Agreement (Dietz et al. 2009). The
obvious neoclassical solution is to raise the price of energy to reduce demand, but studies
have shown that a 10% increase in energy prices only results in a 2.5% reduction in
carbon emissions (Azevedo et al. 2011). Another issue with the price mechanism is
determining the right level of taxation to achieve societally efficient goals. There are
large variations in quantifying the ‘right’ Pigouvian taxes, which are supposed to account
for the cost of externalities. Some economists argue a gasoline tax should be over $10 per
gallon to properly reflect the externalities of gas consumption, others say the figure is
closer to 60 cents (Harris and Roach 2018, 297). One 2015 estimate from the
International Monetary Fund found that while global subsidies for fossil fuels amounted
to over $300 billion, the true subsidy is closer to $5 trillion when accounting for
externalities (Harris and Roach 2018, 293). Another study found that after accounting for
behavioral factors, “the optimal environmental tax should exceed the standard Pigouvian
tax” (Shogren & Taylor 2008). The up-front costs of shutting down a coal power plant
and switching to solar or wind energy are high, so we tend to ignore the long-term costs
of sticking with the status quo. We underestimate the costs of externalities because
environmental degradation is seen as necessary for economic growth and is incredibly
difficult to estimate in monetary terms. After all, how does one put a dollar sign on the
cost of Florida being swallowed by the ocean in a hundred years? In addition to
underestimating the true costs of building and sustaining economies on fossil fuels, we
also underestimate the positive externalities of investing in a greener economy. It is
estimated that the pollution from coal power plants leads to the deaths of more than
13,000 people in the US every year, yet the cause and effect are not immediately salient,
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so we underestimate these externalities, bury our heads in the sand, and tolerate a status
quo of unsustainable carbon emissions (Harris & Roach 2018, 283). Therefore, because
CBA fails to account for behavioral biases, because it assumes the probabilistic forecasts
of costs and benefits to be complete and accurate, and because it fails to account for how
people conceptualize value, it perpetuates the climate crisis rather than providing
pragmatic solutions.
The magnitude of monetary incentives’ effects is limited because people are not
rational economic agents. For instance, the promise of energy savings is not enough of an
incentive to break people out of their energy-inefficient habits. One study estimated that
$520 billion spent on transitioning away from old, inefficient technologies could result in
a 23% reduction in energy consumption and accrue $1.2 trillion in long-term benefits
(Allcott & Mullainathan 2010). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has noted
improving efficiency in homes, businesses, schools, governments, and industries "is one
of the most constructive, cost-effective ways to address the challenges of high energy
prices, energy security and independence, air pollution, and global climate change"
(Harris & Roach 2018, 217). More recent estimates project that adopting new energyefficient technology has the potential to reduce energy use by 40-60%. The upfront costs
are high, estimated to be around 0.2% of global GDP, but the long-term benefits are
undeniable (Harris and Roach 2018, 296). This is free money sitting on the table! Yet
present bias, which leads people to overestimate short-term costs and underestimate longterm benefits, prevents us from picking it up. Monetary savings have been repeatedly
shown to have negligible effects on energy consumption and sometimes even backfire
(Bator et al. 2019). This is because people do not respond to incentives in a way that is
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consistent with neoclassical theory. Quite often, people understand paying for something
as a moral license to do something not socially desirable (Ariely & Jones 2008). Asking
someone to pay for bad behavior can result in increased bad behavior since the individual
feels morally vindicated in their actions due to their payment.
Upon closer observation, the solutions to climate change proposed by neoclassical
economics are not solutions at all; they contribute to the problem. CBA fails to capture
how humans interact with and value the natural world and provides a convenient moral
framework to justify continued unsustainable levels of environmentally destructive
consumption. Unwavering faith in CBA has resulted in an unreflective capitalist
hivemind rapidly consuming all of the world’s natural resources with little to no regard
for future generations. People are prone to status quo bias, availability bias, and loss
aversion which means we are not as responsive to monetary incentives as mainstream
models predict. Additionally, current methods for establishing value estimates of the
environment are biased, inaccurate, and chaotic. “Money, as it turns out, is very often the
most expensive way to motivate people” (Ariely & Jones 2008, 94). According to
mainstream economics, behavioral factors are irrelevant, but incorporating these
psychological realities into models of human behavior provides economists with more
tools to encourage sustainable growth and consumption. One study, which compared a
series of behavioral interventions against energy discounts for good behavior, found that
behavioral nudges were 9 times more cost-effective at reducing energy consumption than
monetary discounts (Benartzi et al. 2014). This is because, unlike monetary solutions,
behavioral interventions account for things like intuitions, emotions, and an imperfect
decision-making process. It is rational to want to save the world. It is rational to
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consume within the ecological boundaries of the planet. Yet we (especially those in
developed nations) do not consume sustainably because we are not rational. Human
psychology guarantees irrational behavior; therefore, we need to be reminded to act
rationally; we need to keep our partial spectator in check. Shifting mainstream models
away from rational agents and towards human beings is the first step for more pragmatic
and cost-effective approaches to curbing hedonistic consumption.

4.2 What Shouldn’t Have Worked (But Has?)
Thus far, this thesis has covered systematic failures in human rationality that
directly contribute to the climate crisis. However, these failures in rationality are not
explicitly bad. The modern capitalist world exploits these systematic biases to propagate
short-term hedonistic consumption, but these biases can also be used to our advantage.
That is to say, we can use these psychological heuristics to change behavior for the better.
An array of literature has shown that nonmonetary incentives are, in many circumstances,
more effective than monetary incentives at achieving a given goal. This includes reducing
carbon emissions, habituating sustainable consumption, and properly valuing the
environment.
Take, for example, the way people respond to man-made ecological disasters such
as an oil spill. Because the scale of destruction is so mind-bogglingly large, our brains
have a hard time valuing the true cost of the disaster. This is evident in the fact that WTP
measures are shown to have little correlation with the magnitude of a disaster. In one
large-scale survey, subjects were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save
either 2,000 birds or 200,000 birds from an oil spill. Despite the latter number being 100x
70

larger than the first, the WTP responses were remarkably similar, with the first group
averaging a willingness to pay of $80 to save 2k birds and the second answering $88 to
save 200k birds. However, both groups significantly increased their WTP after being
shown pictures of individual birds drowning in oil (Kahneman 2011, 93). This shows that
humans are not as receptive to changes in quantities as neoclassical models may assume,
but we are receptive to emotional queues. Salience is key in our decision-making, so
making an invisible problem visible results in a higher willingness to actually do
something about the problem. Many of the negative outcomes of high carbon emissions
are, for the time being, invisible, or at least less salient than whatever else is happening in
the world on a given day. With this in mind, researchers have tried to make those
invisible outcomes more salient through a variety of means and with varying degrees of
success. In particular, increasing the feedback that people receive on their consumption
habits has been shown to have a significant effect on behavior. In one study, which
focused on the behavior of people who did not pay for their own energy usage, behavioral
interventions were shown to effectively reduce consumption even though the individuals
did not stand to gain monetarily due to decreased consumption (Bator et al. 2019).
Another study found that the amplification of the prosocial and private benefits of
conservation decreased energy usage for every decile of energy user. It also found that
communicating the environmental and health externalities of electricity usage
outperformed monetary savings information at driving behavioral change (Asensio &
Delmas 2015). Water usage was shown to decrease by 23% in households where water
use stickers were placed on showers and appliances, whereas studies using monetary
incentives to decrease water consumption are mixed (Byerly et al. 2018). Lastly,
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provoking competitive behavior has been shown to be effective at decreasing energy
consumption. In one study, neighbors who received energy reports that compared them to
their neighbors decreased energy consumption across all deciles of energy users (Schultz
et al. 2018). There is a danger in using competitive behavior as you do not want to
inadvertently encourage the lowest energy users to consume more, but using this
nonmonetary incentive is effective in a variety of contexts. A study involving millions of
households showed that increasing feedback could have a scalable impact on energy
consumption, concluding that energy reports with behavioral queues could reduce carbon
emissions by 0.5% (Allcott & Mullainathan 2010). This is obviously not enough to stop
climate change in its tracks, but it's a cheap, politically pragmatic place to start. We also
want to avoid falling into a false dichotomy of monetary versus nonmonetary incentives.
In fact, research shows that the most effective behavior change comes when behavioral
queues are coupled with monetary incentives. In one study a behavioral intervention
more than tripled the effect of a monetary incentive, but when the interventions were
combined, the effect was 10x larger than that of the control group (Figueroa et al. 2013).
Outside of the realm of energy consumption, researchers have been studying
various behavioral biases and how to overcome them. Take the Kenyan farmers from
Chapter 2 who fell victim to the planning fallacy: almost all of the farmers said they were
planning to fertilize their fields, yet only around 1/3rd of them actually did. To overcome
this, researchers offered farmers free delivery of fertilizer early in the planting season,
when bank account balances are at their highest. This resulted in the adoption rate
increasing from 37% to 70% (Duflo et al. 2011). How? By taking advantage of people’s
present bias and ‘tricking’ them into acting rationally. By removing the two most salient
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barriers preventing widescale fertilization practices (transportation costs and high upfront costs) researchers counteracted the relevant behavioral biases to achieve a more
prosocial outcome. As mentioned earlier, switching default 401(k) contributions from an
‘opt-in’ system to an ‘opt-out’ system increased saving behavior by 70% (Madrian &
Shea 2001). This takes advantage of people’s status-quo bias and the fact that people will
often choose the path of least resistance rather than always actively attempting to
maximize utility. These are but two examples of many areas in which behavioral
interventions have proven to be cost-effective ways to change behavior. Incorporating
behavioral insights into economic theory has influenced college enrollment, the justice
system, medicine, savings rates, and insurance (Thaler 2015).
Behavioral insights were omitted from neoclassical models because they were
believed to add unnecessary complexity to economic systems. Neoclassical economists
did away with the real world and constructed their own in an attempt to understand
economic activity and how it should work. However, there was a gradual shift in
understanding that those models describe how the world does work, which normalized
unsustainable levels of consumption and carbon emissions. Therefore, neoclassical
solutions to real-world problems are inadequate to fix the problem. Acknowledging that
people are limited in various ways, and that bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and
bounded self-interest are societally pervasive realities is the first step in correcting the
course. We need to focus on what actually works.
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Chapter 5: New Solutions and Old Problems
The lack of human behavior has plagued mainstream economic theories since
their inception in the mid 19th century. Widespread acceptance that mainstream theories
provide adequate tools for achieving societally efficient outcomes has resulted in the
proliferation of hedonistic thought and general overconsumption. Incorporating
behavioral insights into economic theory leads to an array of new cost-effective policy
proposals for achieving carbon emission goals. However, even with this course
correction, behavioral interventions are not capable of cutting carbon emissions alone. In
fact, many of the epistemological issues first identified by Smith, Mill, and Knight
equally apply to behavioral models as they do neoclassical models. Therefore,
policymakers must be aware of potential pitfalls when choosing the objectives of
environmental policy, and of the ethical consequences of “correcting” the utility
maximizing model of human behavior.

5.1 Policy Solutions and Paths Forward
The main takeaway of behavioral studies is that nonmonetary incentives, which
account for the boundaries of human rationality, are frequently more cost-effective at
changing behavior than monetary incentives. Since people are not cold, calculating
rational agents in endless pursuit of maximization, appealing to emotion, to one's partial
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spectator, can be more effective than cash incentives. Behavioral economists have
identified actionable solutions in four key areas: defaults, reframing information, coolingoff periods, and limiting consumer choices (Camerer 2003).
For example, when 401(k) tax subsidies are reduced, it is expected that
contributions will fall proportionally as people move their assets around to maximize
return. Experimental evidence shows that the vast majority of people do not adjust saving
behavior at all in response to reduced tax benefits because 85% of people are passive
savers (Chetty 2015). This shows the importance of defaults in decision-making. When
crafting public policy, politicians need to be especially cognizant of the defaults they are
creating and the expected outcomes knowing that people assume the default option to be
best. Policy makers need to identify the areas where they can take advantage of people's
reliance on defaults (Thaler & Sunstein 2003). This could be extended to expanding
programs that encourage updating old technology to energy-efficient modern technology.
If people are automatically enrolled in energy savings programs and have to actively optout of adopting new, green technology, the passive savers of the world (most of us) will
reduce their carbon emissions without even noticing. Information framing was shown to
have significant effects on people's valuations of the environment and their own wellbeing, so reframing the environmental crisis as actively harming people rather than being
a necessary trade-off for economic growth leads to a higher valuation of ecological
processes. Therefore, reducing pollution will be easier if it is framed as reducing harm
rather than improving things. Mitigation policies will be more effective than
compensation policies because it prevents loss rather than paying people less than what
they feel they deserve for their losses (Knetsch 1991).
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Cooling-off periods act as a check on the partial spectator, on the part of us that
wants the flashy car, the sugary foods, and the newest generation of smartphone. It is
enforced self-control. The National Park System is the most obvious example of
environmental self-control policy. Knowing that the capitalistic mindset will inevitably
exploit and ruin even the most beautiful and awe-inspiring corners of the earth, the US
government decided to set aside areas of the country that could not be developed and
were protected by the federal government. Many of the proposals for National Parks cited
the same ecological disaster: Niagara Falls. Niagara Falls had been one of the earliest
natural wonders exploited by American tourists much to the demise of indigenous people,
naturalists, and environmentalists. There were cable cars strung across the river, people
consistently threw themselves over the falls in publicity stunts, and the area around the
falls was rapidly developed to accommodate a large number of tourists. Numerous
proposals for future National Parks used the emotional argument of a desire to “avoid the
next Niagara” (Burns 2009). Adam Smith wrote that acting with self-control is to act
virtuously and is not a given, so governments should shape policies that encourage selfcontrol. This can include requiring cool-off periods for high carbon-emitting
consumption, like buying a car, and restrictions on environmentally degrading
development.
Lastly, lawmakers should aim to limit consumer choices in areas where people
fragment their time and resources because gains are only realized in the long run. This is
in direct opposition to neoclassical theory which holds that more choices allow for
greater market optimization and is due to the fact that people are prone to making
suboptimal choices when presented with too many options. This is true for insurance
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participation, savings plans, and general consumption (Camerer 2003). The benefits of
sustainable consumption are not immediately salient, so lawmakers should shape policies
that guide people towards acting more responsibly. For example, energy consumption
consists of a complex, somewhat subconscious set of choices. Homebuilders frequently
opt to forego insulating a new house because the up-front cost is too high. However, the
decision to avoid this up-front cost results in a large increase in the cost of heating the
home, which, over time, is significantly more expensive and environmentally damaging
than insulating the home in the first place (Thaler 2008). Policies that eliminate this
complexity from the decision-making process (for example, financing the insulation of
the home through energy savings) lead to more efficient societal outcomes.
This is a short, incomplete list of potential government actions that could curb
carbon emissions in a cost-effective manner. However, they all are a departure from
neoclassical economic theory and the assumption of rational markets. Policymakers
should not view their constituents as hyper-rational utility monsters; they should view
them as human beings. Human beings are full of confusing, paradoxical, violent,
imaginary passions that constantly undermine our long-term self-interests. Not only does
this outlook explain why we are on the cusp of an unprecedented climate crisis, but it also
provides some paths forward. In recognizing that an unregulated free market does not
automatically arrive at the societally optimal outcome, we can reframe the role of
government in creating a sustainable future. We do not need to throw prices and
incentives out the window, as they can be incredibly useful at shaping demand and
perceptions of the world, but we also need to integrate psychological insights into policy
solutions. “The best way to help Humans improve their performance is to provide
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feedback” (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, 92). In terms of daily habits, there are four areas that
individuals, especially Americans and Canadians, can focus on to reduce emissions:
eating a plant-based diet (0.8 tons of CO2 per year), avoiding air travel (1.6 tpy), living
car-free (2.4 tpy), and having smaller families. Of course, there is structural inertia that
prevents everyone from ditching meat consumption, air, and car travel altogether, but
improving feedback on consumption can have a sizable effect. Studies have shown that
interventions can curb emissions by 0.6% in the case of meat consumption and 3.2% in
the case of car travel (Wynes et al. 2018). Air travel may provide the biggest opportunity
for a reduction in carbon emissions, as a person electing not to go on a transatlantic round
trip saves as much carbon as 11 households participating in an energy savings program
for an entire year. Yet, remarkably, there have been no wide-scale studies that have
attempted to curb air travel through behavioral interventions.

5.2 Critique of Behavioralists
While the research of behavioral economists has shed light on numerous flaws in
mainstream theory, there are several legitimate critiques of the field and its findings. The
first issue is the scale and scope of research that has been done thus far. Many
psychological studies suffer from selection bias and struggle to be replicated. This is not
as big of a concern in behavioral economics because many of the aforementioned
heuristics and biases are observable on a market scale. However, the efficacy of
behavioral interventions in promoting pro-social behavior is more subject to debate. Most
of the studies done thus far have been limited in their purview and sample size. With few
exceptions, it is hard to know whether or not a particular intervention is scalable (Byerly
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et al. 2018). Additionally, while studies have identified a plethora of psychological biases
and heuristics, we do not understand which type of behavioral interventions work in a
given context (Chetty 2015). It is one thing to identify errors in human reasoning and a
completely separate challenge to use these errors to our advantage. The only way to
overcome these shortcomings is further research. Research needs to increase both in
terms of scope and scale to realize the full potential of incorporating behavioral insights
into economic theory.
In addition to the pragmatic issues associated with the behavioralists’ mindset,
there are political problems as well. Most behavioralist economists view the insights of
their research as an argument for more government regulation to promote efficient
outcomes. Others view these conclusions as a slippery slope to government paternalism
and that the errors exposed to us through behavioral studies should make us more, not
less wary of government intervention in the market (Glaeser 2006). While this claim is
valid (after all government officials are prone to the same biases as those they are
regulating) the failures of the free market are too obvious to ignore. Government
intervention in the market will never be perfect for the same reason that government
nonaction will never achieve efficient outcomes. However, to argue that the existence of
behavioral biases should lead to less government in shaping and guiding consumption
choices is to ignore virtually all empirical evidence.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, there are numerous philosophical concerns
with adopting the behavioralist outlook. Many of the epistemological and moral
shortcomings first identified by Smith, Mill, Veblen, and Knight equally apply to
behavioralist theories as they do neoclassical theory. Behavioralist economists are still
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reliant on quantitative methods for determining the truth and modeling human behavior.
The two-agent model may be more accurate at describing human behavior than the
rational utility optimizer, but it is still a model of human behavior, which is arguably not
modellable. One of the primary successes of Behavioral Economics is Prospect Theory,
developed by Kahneman and Tversky, in which an agent’s current emotional state is what
ultimately determines consumption choices (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). However, in
formulating the theory, the authors fail to address the underlying misassumptions of
neoclassical theories. “The assumptions… of transforming, multiplying, and adding, as
well as an exhaustive knowledge of actions and outcomes are equally defensible, or
indefensible, since they play nearly identical roles in both theories” (Berg & Gigerenzer
2010). Instead of starting from scratch, behavioral models add new parameters to existing
models which automatically increases the R-squared (Berg & Gigerenzer 2010).
Additionally, behavioral models cling to the neoclassical assumption that behavior is
driven by the pursuit of constrained optimization, even if it is flawed. This assumption is
fundamentally different from how people actually value things, both tangible and
intangible; literature has shown that people’s preferences typically exhibit a
“lexicographic structure” where the value of a thing cannot be fully captured through
pricing (Berg & Gigerenzer 2010). With lexicographical preferences, people’s valuation
of often arbitrary objects cannot be captured by an indifference curve. The agent prefers
any amount of one good to any amount of another; the utility of certain goods is
infinitesimal compared to others. This may exhibit itself as intense brand loyalty,
connection to one’s hometown or family, or devotion to a religious, political, or cultural
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set of values. In ignoring this reality, behavioral economists may have “resold”
Friedman’s as-if framework rather than transforming it.
Behavioralist models, in addition to only slightly adjusting neoclassical theory,
also fall into the hedonist trap first forewarned of by Veblen and Knight. Behavioral
economists, including Kahneman and Tversky, assume rational behavior is equivalent to
morally upstanding behavior, that acting rationally is how one ought to act (Berg &
Gigerenzer 2010). Therefore, according to behavioralists, the goal of behavioral policy is
to motivate people to behave “rationally” because that achieves the best societal
outcomes. This assumption is not only dangerous, but empirically misguided. In fact,
studies have suggested that human brains are intelligent precisely because they make
informed guesses beyond a given set of information, not in spite of it (Berg & Gigerenzer
2010). Furthermore, there is no evidence that shows people who fail to act in a rationally
consistent manner suffer economic losses, live shorter lives, earn less money, or are less
happy than those who do. In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction. People
who violate expected utility and show time inconsistent behavior tend to earn more
money than their ‘rational’ counterparts. Furthermore, the beliefs of non-Bayesians tend
to be more accurate than those of perfect Bayesians and are “better calibrated to objective
risk frequencies in the real-world decision-making environment” (Berg & Gigerenzer
2010). This evidence shows that the goals of behavioral policies are limited in scope and
erroneous. The investigation of most behavioral studies is limited to testing whether
behavior conforms to the normative ideals of neoclassical models, and if not, how to
correct that behavior so that it does. This leads behavioralists back to the same
conclusions of Friedman, Samuelson, and other neoclassical economists via a different
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route; the hedonism-normalizing ends of normative models are once again considered
desirable.
The debate can be boiled down to consequentialist versus deontological
reasoning. According to the consequentialist viewpoint, the morality of an action is
measured by its outcomes. Actions are not judged to be good or bad based on an
overarching moral code; there are no actions that are inherently good or inherently bad.
Neoclassical cost-benefit analysis falls firmly in the consequentialist camp. Theoretically,
any action can be considered advisable as long as the net projected benefits outweigh the
costs. Cutting down a forest, stripping the land of its natural resources, spewing
unfathomable amounts of carbon into the atmosphere, and leaving the world unfit for
future generations is not immoral in and of itself insofar as the benefits outweigh the
costs. Behavioralists also fall into the consequentialist mindset. The advisability of policy
solutions is measured based on their ability to achieve a given outcome. These criteria
may differ slightly from those used by neoclassical economists, but they are quantitative
in nature. For example, behavioralists have observed vast discrepancies between WTP
and WTA measures of environmental valuation but do not conclude that both of these
measures are too defective to provide accurate value estimates. They, instead, argue that
WTA measures provide a more accurate value estimate than WTP measures. They notice
the empirical shortcomings of normative theory and propose a slight modification of the
original theory. On the other hand, the deontological viewpoint proposes that actions
should be judged based on deontic values, an ineffable sense of right and wrong. A
deontological outlook breaks away from the practice of collapsing the value of everything
in existence into a single monetary value; it allows for environmental processes to have
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value in and of themselves, independent of human utility. Deontic values are often
criticized for being arbitrary and self-serving; this is unavoidable. However, the calculus
of consequentialist philosophy is what leads to the rise of a hedonistic economy and
pervasive overconsumption. Saving the climate requires a shift in cultural values, away
from short-term consumption and towards a sustainable future, not because it is the most
cost-effective way of living, but because it is the right thing to do.

83

Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Concluding Remarks
Since the inception of political economy, economists have been acutely aware of
the importance of behavioral factors in the human decision-making process. Adam Smith
wrote extensively about the ever-present duel between one’s partial spectator and
impartial spectator and the important role of the “passions” in decisions making. Smith,
echoing writers dating back to ancient Greece, observed that human passions and the
influence of the partial spectator make people behave in a way that is often in direct
conflict with their self-interest. Despite this, the field of economics adopted a
methodology that assumes that on the aggregate, people behave rationally. John Stuart
Mill and Thorstein Veblen were amongst the first to recognize the dangers of confusing
the "abstract" agent in economic models with human behavior in the real world. By
focusing solely on outcomes and automatically labeling those outcomes as 'optimal', we
normalize societal hedonism and unsustainable levels of consumption. Later, Frank
Knight and Irving Fisher recognized that the bulk of human values and behavior are a
product of societal context, not an economic calculus. The data used to model “rational
behavior” is actually the product of a “historically created process” and does not shed
light on what is optimal or how one ought to act in the world. Despite these warnings,
economics went down a hyper-normative route which built models on the assumption of
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rationality. The neoclassical utility optimization models formulated during the 1940s and
1950s became accepted as truth and people continued to consume more and more with no
limit in sight.
Now, we find ourselves in the midst of an unprecedented ecological crisis. Carbon
emissions continue to rise, oceans continue to acidify, biodiversity continues to fall, and
temperature trends are reaching all-time highs. A world full of rational agents should
recognize the problem and adjust their behavior accordingly, so why aren't we?
Behavioral economics contains some answers. Since the 1970s, economists have been
exposing behavioral heuristics that cause empirical deviations from neoclassical theories,
many of which help explain the perpetuation of climate change. Availability bias, status
quo bias, projection bias, and the focusing illusion all have profound effects on people’s
consumption behavior and how they value ecological processes. Additionally, these
biases make it difficult to break people out of unsustainable levels of consumption once
they have been habituated to a status quo of overconsumption. However, by
acknowledging the existence of these systematic deviations from normative models,
policymakers have a new set of cost-effective tools which are more cost-effective at
achieving societally beneficial goals. Many studies have shown that behavioral
interventions, which incorporate psychological insights, are more cost-effective at
changing people's behavior than the manipulation of the pricing mechanism.
While the work of behavioral economists has undoubtedly provided much-needed
realism into economic models, they also tend to ignore the epistemological and moral
implications of advocating for rational behavior. The main issue is that behavioral
economics fully embraces the same moral framework as neoclassical economics.
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Neoclassical theory uses outcomes as a universal unit of valuation to measure the
consequences of actions; the goal of neoclassical models is to optimize welfare as defined
by the satisfaction of preferences (Hausman 2006, 230). All other ethical considerations
are important, but ultimately outside of the purview of economic thought. In adopting this
moral framework, behavioralists committed the same cardinal sin as classical and
neoclassical economists. As Smith, Mill, Veblen, and others had previously noted, how
one ought to act is frequently antithetical to what maximizes personal utility. Both
neoclassical and behavioral economists reject this notion and insist that rationality and
morality are one and the same. This is what opens the door for normalizing hedonism and
is the irony of behavioral economics. If we live our lives in the sole pursuit of optimizing
utility according to a hedonistic calculus, if we accept that the “direct and unhampered
quest of net sensuous gain” is what delineates right from wrong, we can rationalize and
morally justify overconsumption today at the expense of tomorrow. Of course, one could
also make the argument that when it comes to addressing climate change, rational
behavior is exactly what we should be aiming for, however, this comes with the necessary
caveat to reevaluate the definition of “rational behavior.”
There is no singular path forward for the field of economics. The realities of
human psychology will never be fully incorporated into mainstream models because
human behavior isn't normative. Behavioral economists made this observation decades
ago, yet the branch of study has ended up at the same conclusion Friedman first outlined
almost 70 years ago. The insights of behavioral studies are undoubtedly useful and there
are many exciting new tools policymakers have at their disposal when it comes to
addressing climate issues. Since the goal is to reduce carbon emissions, policymakers can
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incorporate knowledge of systematic biases to craft more cost-effective policies.
However, the unquestioned piety to rational behavior, the belief that how one ought to act
and how one should rationally act are the same is insidious and banal. For the climate
crisis to be dealt with on its true scale, we need radical and transformative action. Not
only because it passes the normative tests of CBA (which it does), but because it is the
right thing to do for ourselves and for future generations. In the meantime, it is worth
testing the scalability of behavioral interventions in reducing carbon emissions, as well as
expanding the use of behavioral interventions to encourage low carbon-emitting
behavior. These interventions will not be sufficient to reverse the climate crisis, but they
are certainly a step in the right direction. At the very least, we must recognize the failure
of the status quo, of using pricing mechanisms to solve environmental issues. Polanyi
recognized this reality in the 1940s, “To allow the market mechanism to be sole director
of the fate of human beings… would result in the demolition of society… nature would
be reduced to its elements" (Polanyi 1944, 76).
There is no silver bullet for solving climate change. There is no global climate
czar that has the final say on what development does and does not happen, and even if
there were such a person, their job would not be easy. Every corner of human existence is
affected by climate change. Transportation, energy usage, inequality, human welfare, and
profit incentives are all part of the nexus that simultaneously causes, and contains the
solution to climate change. The first step is recognizing the magnitude of the climate
problem and addressing hedonistic overconsumption at its roots.
Before the modern age, the American naturalist and philosopher Henry David
Thoreau recognized the hedonistic trends of an increasingly industrialized society and the
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failure of modern people to consider or recognize the true consequences of their actions.
“By conscious effort of the mind we can stand aloof from actions and their consequences;
and all things, good and bad, go by us like a torrent. We are not wholly involved in
Nature” (Thoreau 1853, 66). This observation is well ahead of its time and gets directly at
the heart of today’s climate crisis: we are not wholly involved in Nature. Humanity has
separated itself from the natural order and only “know Nature but as a robber” (Thoreau
1853, 81). To achieve a sustainable future, we must reframe this relationship, become
more mindful of the consequences of our actions, and redefine what it means to
“optimize.” By digging into the history of economic thought, incorporating insights from
adjacent social sciences, and understanding the epistemological limits of normative
methodology, economics can be useful in the effort to consume less today in order to
save tomorrow.
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